



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

ART. VII.—1. *Du Système Permanent de l'Europe à l'égard de la Russie, et des Affaires de l'Orient*, par M. DE PRADT, ancien Archevêque de Malines. Paris. 1828.

2. *Statistique des Libertés de l'Europe en 1829*, par le Même. Paris. 1829.

IN a former article, which appeared in our number for July, 1828, we ventured to offer a few hasty and imperfect suggestions on the political situation of Europe, at the commencement of the late war between Russia and Turkey. We then intimated, that, although the result of the struggle was in a great measure uncertain, the not unfounded jealousy, entertained by Great Britain and the other western powers, of the constantly progressive influence of Russia, would combine with the moderation, for which we were disposed to give credit to the latter government, to limit as much as possible the duration and geographical theatre of the war, and might be expected to bring it pretty early to a close, which would be conformable, in its results, to the policy of Russia, and the wishes of the friends of civilization and humanity throughout the world. These anticipations have been, in the main, confirmed by the progress of events. Although the first campaign in Europe was hardly distinguished by so brilliant a course of triumphs on the part of Russia, as the rivals and the well-wishers of that power had alike foretold; yet, taking the two campaigns in Europe together and including the two in Asia, the exhibition of military power has, upon the whole, quite equalled the most exalted expectations, that either fear or hope could have suggested beforehand. On the other side, the influence of the policy of the western nations, especially Great Britain, in restraining the advances of Russia, and limiting the duration and theatre of the contest, has been distinctly visible at every step; while the facility and good grace with which the Emperor accommodated his proceedings to the successive and not always perfectly reasonable or consistent demands of his anxious allies, and the moderate conditions on which he has granted another term of national existence to an enemy completely at his mercy, evince a spirit of generosity, good faith, and, we may add, good policy, as commendable as it is uncommon in the councils of governments, especially of the form and character of that of Russia. The resistance of the Turks, although at the

first moment somewhat obstinate, turned out, on the whole, to be as feeble and as badly directed as there was every reason to suppose that it would be, from the well-known decrepitude of that ruined and tottering empire. The terms of the peace, were dictated, as we have just remarked, in a spirit of moderation towards Turkey, and good faith towards the other powers ; but are yet decidedly favorable to the future advancement of Russia ;—a great deal more so, probably, than if they had evinced, and for the moment gratified, the most inordinate and grasping ambition. The general result places in strong relief the relative strength of the two belligerents, and completely settles the question, already free from doubt in the minds of most judicious men, of the military preponderance of Russia in the southeast of Europe, and indirectly, by a necessary consequence, over the whole continent.

This result, while it involves consequences of the deepest interest to the western nations of the old world, is by no means a matter of indifference to us. The state of the international relations among the great powers of Europe, constitutes regularly one of the principal elements to be taken into view in making up an opinion on our own foreign policy ; and it is of high moment that our statesmen, and the public at large, should possess correct information respecting the changes that successively occur in the nature of these relations. We therefore venture to hope, that we shall not be considered as deviating too far from the line of observation, which seems to be naturally marked out for an American Journal, by offering a few hints on this subject. We shall first briefly notice, chiefly under a political point of view, some of the events of the war, and shall then indulge in a few conjectures on its probable effects upon the political situation of Europe and the world. The general object of our remarks will be to develope and substantiate the suggestions contained in the preceding paragraph.

We must here premise, that, in our opinion, as we have already in fact intimated, the result of the war, while it has been highly agreeable to the policy of Russia, is also conformable to the wishes of the friends of civilization and humanity throughout the world. We have seen at times, with surprise, the idea thrown out in some of our most respectable journals, that the sympathies of the people of this country were on the side of the Turks in this struggle, because the Russians had

carried the war, so wantonly provoked by the former, back into their territory. With all our respect for the writers alluded to, we cannot but think that they have mistaken the feelings of the people on the point in question. If indeed they merely mean by *sympathy* the sentiment of commiseration which naturally springs up in the mind, at the view of a fellow-being in a state of suffering, however obviously the result of his own fault or crime, there can of course be no objection to the use of the term in this connexion. But if, as seems more probable, it be intended to convey the impression, that there was anything wrong on the part of Russia, in invading the territory of the Ottoman empire for the purpose of obtaining satisfaction for the manifold injuries and insults which she had received from that power during the series of years that has elapsed since the last treaty, or that there has been any exhibition of an overbearing spirit in her deportment during the course of the war, or of the negotiations that preceded and terminated it, we must, for our part at least, dissent entirely from the opinion. So far indeed are we from taking this view of the subject, that we consider the Russian government as having shown a reluctance to enter on the war, and an anxiety to employ every possible method for escaping from it, which, in a weaker power, would have been looked upon as actually dishonorable, which unquestionably contributed to raise the pretensions and increase the insolence of the Turks, and which nothing but the extreme delicacy of the relations between Russia and the other great powers of Europe would have at all justified. There cannot be a doubt, that the reckless levity with which the Turks broke the treaty of Akerman, before the ink with which they had signed it was fairly dry, and the contemptuous frankness with which they avowed, in their official manifesto, that they signed it merely to gain time and overreach the Russians, were the effect of the long delay and unexampled patience exhibited by the latter during the negotiations, and which the Turks, whose vocabulary contains no expression for such ideas as those of good faith and good policy, could only attribute to bodily fear. The people of the United States know how to commiserate the distress, which the comparatively innocent population of Turkey must have suffered in consequence of the invasion of their territory, however rightful in itself, and however moderately and judiciously conducted; as they would commiserate the innocent and suffering

connexions of a pirate, who was sentenced by the laws of his country to expiate a life of cruelty and horror on the gibbet. It is the lot of humanity, that the innocent must suffer, to a certain extent, for the crimes of the guilty ; but as respects the present case it must be recollected, that the body of the people are not, in any country, entirely innocent of the faults of their rulers, since the character of the government is, after all, only an expression of that of the community. Ferocious and unprincipled rulers are the natural product, as they are the appropriate punishment of a vicious and savage state of society, like that which exists in Turkey. For ourselves we must own, that our sympathy is not particularly lively with the distress of a population, which could tolerate in its government such proceedings as the execution of the Greek patriarchs and bishops at the commencement of the revolution, the massacre of the Janissaries, and the expulsion of the Armenians ; and which took a part itself in the diabolical scenes that disgraced the marketplace at Constantinople, when the women of the first Greek families were publicly exposed to violation on the murdered bodies of their husbands and fathers, at the rate of two piastres a head. Whatever natural regret we may feel at the sufferings of a population, savage enough to concur in such horrors as these, or brutal and degraded enough to acquiesce in the perpetration of them by their rulers, the wishes of the friends of humanity and civilization must surely be in favor of the success of a power, which undertakes to teach such a people by the application of mere force, the only argument they can or do understand, some respect for the rights and feelings of others. The President of the United States takes a more correct view of the subject in his late message to Congress, where, while he expresses rather more sympathy with the sufferings of the Turks, than he would perhaps be warranted in doing by the actual feelings of the people, he nevertheless anticipates that the result of the war will be favorable to the cause of civilization and the progress of human happiness. It would show a very puerile sort of weakness to suppose, that a powerful government, like that of Russia, is to pocket every species of injury and outrage from a feeble, semi-barbarous state, and not seek redress in the only practicable way, for fear of inflicting on the individuals composing that state the evils inseparable from invasion. The respectable editors, who represent the Russians as hostile aggressors, express, on our view of the case,

not the sentiments of the American people, but those of the British politicians, which they have unconsciously imbibed from reading the accounts of the war, and the negotiations which preceded and terminated it, chiefly in the British newspapers, accompanied with commentaries dictated by a natural jealousy of Russia. The truth is (at least as we apprehend the subject), that the friends of humanity feel no other regret on the occasion of this war and its close, excepting that the complicated character of the relations between the great powers of Europe prevented them from improving the present opportunity for effecting, in concert, the entire destruction of the Turkish empire, and expelling for ever, from civilized Europe, the horde of ruthless barbarians who have so long brooded like a night-mare over one of the fairest portions of her territory. When we recollect that another week's march, which there was nothing to impede, would have brought the Russian army to Constantinople, and that the mere fact of their presence there would have driven back the Ottomans into their native Scythian deserts, and restored to the influence of civilization and Christianity the delightful regions that embosom the Mediterranean, the ancient seats of all our art, science, and religion, and which would become again, under these circumstances, as they were of old, the garden of the world, instead of being, as they are under their present masters, given up to desolation, and, substantially, no better than the pestilential haunts of a sort of privileged pirates;—when we recollect this, we certainly do feel some regret that the immediate results of the war had not been of a more complete and decisive character.

Such, we repeat, is the point to which the only regret we have on this occasion is almost exclusively directed. But while we could have wished, for these reasons, that the results of the war had been different, we are not disposed to impute blame to any one because they have not been so. We are fully aware that the considerations, which operated in giving them their present form, are on all sides just and weighty. The apprehensions entertained by the western nations of the prodigious and constantly progressive power of Russia, are perfectly well-founded, nor do they necessarily imply any injurious suspicions of the intentions of the present Emperor, but simply a correct notion of the ordinary course and motives of human action. It was natural and proper for these nations to endeavor to restrict as much as possible the further advancement of

Russian influence, which must, at all events, result from the late struggle; while, on the other hand, the readiness with which the Emperor, out of compliment to their apprehensions, arrested his progress in the full tide of victory over an enemy who had no right, on his own account, to claim or expect the least consideration, was a strong proof, not only of moderation and good policy, but of really noble and generous feelings. It was impossible in the nature of things that the great European powers should terminate, in an amicable way, the territorial arrangements which would have been rendered necessary by a concerted and, of course, successful attack by them all on the Porte; and it was better for all parties, probably in the end for the aggrandisement of Russia, the one which has exhibited the highest degree of magnanimity on the occasion, that the Turkish empire should be left to crumble to pieces by an internal process of decay, and that its territory should distribute itself to future occupants, in such a way as the force of circumstances may determine.

Without, however, dwelling any further on these preliminary considerations, we shall proceed to offer a few suggestions on the events of the war, and on the negotiations that terminated and preceded it. As respects the latter, it would be difficult to find a stronger example of the utter inefficacy of mere diplomacy, however ably conducted, and, indeed, as such, successful, for the purpose of controlling the force of circumstances, and accomplishing important political objects. The negotiation which immediately preceded the war was planned and conducted, on the part of Great Britain, by the ablest minister who has appeared in that kingdom for half a century past; and he succeeded in completing his arrangements probably to his own entire satisfaction. He obtained the signature or approbation of all the principal powers to the celebrated treaty of London, by the effect of which he intended, under the appearance of coöperating with Russia for the emancipation of Greece, to hold the former in leading-strings, sustain Turkey, compel the Greeks to be content with a qualified independence, and especially remove all danger of war. Such were the objects of these diplomatic conventions; but so far were they from answering the expectations of their authors, that they may fairly be regarded as the direct and immediate moving cause of the whole series of *untoward* events that followed them—the battle of Navarino—the war between Turkey and

Russia—the virtual destruction of the former empire, and the complete independence of Greece. The false and unnatural position in which the naval commanders of the allies in the Mediterranean were placed by the treaty of London, produced the encounter of the two hostile fleets; and thus, by a kind of inexplicable fatality, led Great Britain herself to inflict upon her ‘ancient ally’ a blow, second only in severity to that which has since been given by the Russian invasion. The battle of Navarino again, which could only have appeared to the Turks, unskilled as they are in the refinements of European casuistry, an act of open, unprovoked, and even treacherous hostility, was the immediate cause of the war itself, and all its political results. The very measures which were intended to avert the danger of collision, not only determined or, at least, precipitated this occurrence, but created at the same time, by the destruction of the Turkish fleet, a most powerful diversion in favor of the party which their authors were anxious to bind down and cripple in every possible way. Thus terminated this unharmful concert, which was destined, so much against the wishes and intentions of its composers, to serve as an overture to the great work which has since been executed with such decisive success; and thus commenced the war.

This war had long been looked to, by the western powers of Europe, with a sort of breathless anxiety, which has been fully justified by the event, but which was mingled at the time with many grains of encouraging uncertainty, and even flattering hope. The extraordinary display of military power which had been made by Russia, at the close of the war with Napoleon, had left a deep impression on the public mind, which had been recently refreshed and enlivened by the rapid and brilliant success of the invasion of Persia. These positive results, taken in connexion with the vast materials of power which are obviously at the disposal of Russia, had already, in the minds of many judicious statesmen, settled the question of the military preponderance of that empire throughout Europe. Others, whose interest was engaged on the other side, were still willing to be skeptical. The victory over Bonaparte had been achieved in concurrence with powerful allies, under the direction, in part, of a British general, and throughout with the aid of British gold. Persia was but the shadow of a name, too feeble and decrepit to test the power or increase the glory of any conqueror. The Turks, on the other hand, were known to

fight with obstinacy, especially behind entrenchments. The Sultan was an energetic and remorseless tyrant, much superior to the common run of his predecessors, and well-fitted to give a tone to the spirit of his barbarous soldiery. It was not improbable that the war might turn out a tedious and fatiguing one, while the Russian finances, on the other hand, however improved by the indemnity they had just received from Persia, were supposed to be decidedly unequal to the expenses of such a struggle. Such were the views which were entertained by many politicians whose interest was opposed to that of Russia, and which served as a basis for the proceedings of the allies after the opening of the war. Disappointed in their efforts to avert it, and unwilling, at the same time, to encounter the hazard attending a more decisive course, they resolved to temporize and leave something to the chapter of accidents. An expensive and doubtful campaign would be a stronger argument with Russia for the conclusion of peace on easy terms, than any which they could urge in the form of diplomatic address. The Danube and the Balkan were not to be carried by a *coup-de-main*; and supposing the highest expectations of the efficiency of the army to be realized, the allies would still be as well situated for a decisive intervention in favor of Turkey at the opening of the second campaign, as they were at that of the first. It was concluded, therefore, to allow the Emperor to try his fortune. If he failed at the first onset, the Gordian knot of policy would naturally be untied by the mere progress of events; if he succeeded so as to become too dangerous, they were always in season to cut it with the sword.

The only positive check which they attempted to impose upon the progress of the Russian arms, was, that of engaging the Emperor to consent that he would observe a neutrality in the Mediterranean while he was actively at war upon the Danube. The arrangement on this head was announced by the King of Great Britain, in his speech at the opening of Parliament, as a matter of high importance, and wears upon its face the apparent stamp of British origin. It is said, however, by some to have been adopted at the particular request of the French cabinet, and rather against the inclination of England as well as Russia. However this may be, as respects the fact, we incline to doubt whether the two governments or their apologists will hereafter contend very earnestly for the authorship of the measure, which really seems to have done but little

honor to the diplomacy of either. It was, in the first place, absurd in itself; secondly, of too feeble a character to affect, in any great degree, the results of the campaign; and thirdly, by openly evincing a continued jealousy of Russia, it tended, on the whole, to embitter the general relations of the parties to the treaty. The Emperor probably gave his assent, in the first instance, under the idea that the concession was of little or no consequence; and when he found the war proceed rather more heavily than had been anticipated, and thought that the blockade of the Dardanelles would serve a useful purpose, he made no scruple of withdrawing a promise which he doubtless looked upon as given *without consideration*, and, therefore, substantially null. The good grace with which the governments of France and England deemed it convenient to acquiesce in this unexpected change of purpose, formed a pleasant commentary on the air of satisfaction with which the original concession had been announced. The Russian Admiral accordingly declared the Dardanelles to be in a state of blockade, and forgetting, at the moment, the liberal principles which have always been maintained at St. Petersburg on the subject of neutral rights at sea, extended the restriction a little farther than a fair construction of the law of nations would perhaps justify. It was edifying and satisfactory to see with what zeal Great Britain, now one of the neutral powers, espoused the cause of that respectable but generally very ill-used fraternity. No longer ambitious of the sort of glory which, according to some of our law authorities, she reaped during the preceding war, by interpreting the law of nations wholly in favor of the belligerent, and against the neutral, she now, to use a French idiom, *abounded in the other sense*, and with perfect *sang froid*, claimed of Russia the same privileges which she had, for a series of years, so resolutely refused to us. The defence of neutral rights, which Lord Stowell is understood to have written on this occasion, in the favor of a diplomatic despatch, would doubtless compare very well, in point of style and argument, with the plea for belligerent pretensions, which Sir William Scott drew up in the year 1812, in answer to our declaration of war; and the publication of the former is anxiously expected by those who take an interest in such discussions. In the mean time, it appears to have had its effect with the Emperor Nicholas, who, finding himself thus driven back by Great Britain herself to the old ground of the Armed Neutrali-

ty, yielded, in his turn, with much apparent complacency to the very consistent and modest request of that power, disavowed his Admiral, and limited the blockade to the entry of the Dardanelles.

While this diplomatic by-play was going on behind the curtain, the war opened, and brought to the test of experiment the hopes and fears of the interested parties, and the expectations of the world. The course of events, during the first campaign, viewed as it was through the medium of highly raised expectations, appeared to many to be of a doubtful if not decidedly unfavorable character, but was perhaps, on the whole, better fitted than any other to secure the ultimate success of the Russian arms. A decided failure would probably have induced the Emperor (such, at least, was the calculation of the allies) to agree to peace on very easy terms. A more triumphant progress at the outset, by confirming the worst apprehensions of the allies, might have caused them to interfere in such a way as would have brought the war to a close, and prevented the complete developement of power on the part of Russia that has since been exhibited. The advantages which were actually gained, while they were substantial enough to encourage the Russians to persevere, were still sufficiently moderate to quiet, in a great measure, the alarm of the allies. The latter began once more to breathe freely, and felt themselves relieved from the terrors that had haunted their imaginations, without interruption, for fifteen years. If the Danube and Varna, trifling obstacles compared with those that remained behind, cost such sacrifices, it was of course impossible that Shumla and the Balkan should be carried without an arduous and protracted effort. They had, therefore, ample time before them in which to deliberate and act at leisure. Far from making haste to interfere and terminate the war, they rather deemed it the dictate of good policy to allow the Autocrat to waste, in fruitless attempts upon the impregnable barrier of Turkey, the resources that might be more dangerous, if they should ever be employed in a different direction. The *prestige*, that had for some time past been attached to the name of Russia, was now, in their opinion, dispelled; and even if the success of another campaign should, in some degree, redeem the failure of the first, there was no moral possibility that it could be so rapid and decisive as to prevent them from interfering, at any moment, in the character of armed mediators,

and dictating to both parties a safe peace. Little or no effort was, therefore, made by the allies, in the interval between the two campaigns to reconcile the belligerent parties. The Emperor of Russia continued to profess the same moderate intentions as before, and made, in the course of the winter, direct overtures to the Porte. But the same circumstances which had relieved the apprehensions of the allies, had, of course, increased the arrogance of the Ottomans, who began to feel as if they had already advanced half way on the road to Moscow, and rejected with contempt the idea of negotiation.

Under such auspices commenced the second campaign, which was destined to disappoint so completely all the calculations that had been formed upon the first. It does not belong to our purpose to examine minutely the events of either, under a military point of view, or to attempt to discover the causes of the great difference between their respective results. Almost the only important change in the circumstances of the parties, was that which took place in the person of the Commander-in-chief of the main Russian army; and it is not very difficult, even for unpractised eyes, to trace the successes which distinguished the opening of the second campaign, and, apparently, decided its character, to skilful combinations rather than any accidental advantage. It is highly probable, therefore, that it was the fortunate appointment of General Diebitsch, as the successor of Wittgenstein, that gave the war a new turn. We may remark, in general, that whenever there occurs a rapid and brilliant movement in business of any kind, it is owing to the accidental presence of the right man, at the right time and place,—a thing of rare and difficult occurrence; since, in the ordinary slow and encumbered march of human affairs, genius too often fails to produce effect for want of opportunity, and opportunities, on the other hand, are too often lost for want of sense to see, and talent to improve them. Be that, however, as it may, and to whatever cause we may attribute the change in the character of the war, certain it is, that it was complete and decisive. One of the circumstances that concurred in producing it, was the headstrong confidence of the Turks, who now began to despise the Russians as much as they had hitherto feared them; and, by rashly sallying from behind their entrenchments, and taking the chances of battle in open field, to which their tactics are known to be unequal, exposed themselves to almost certain destruction, and gave the

enemy a complete and easy victory. Scarcely had the account of the first success, which did not at the moment appear to be of the highest importance, circulated through the west of Europe, when fresh couriers, following hard upon each other's heels, announced, in rapid succession, the actual passage of the impassable Balkan, the taking of Adrianople without resistance, the advance of the Russian troops on Constantinople and the Dardanelles, in a word, the utter rout and ruin of the Turkish army. In the mean time the Asiatic division of the Russian power under General Paskevitch was pushing forward in a career of conquest, less decisive, perhaps, as respects the immediate objects of the war, but not less brilliant in itself, and scarcely less important in its ultimate results, than the progress of the main army. The close of the war realized or surpassed the highest expectations which had been formed of the efficiency of the Russian arms, and which the character of the preceding campaign had partly disappointed. It brought to mind some of the rapid achievements of Bonaparte, while yet in the freshness of his youthful genius. It was now too late for the allies to think of interfering, for the purpose of dictating, or even materially modifying the terms of peace. Indeed there had not even been time, since the change in the character of the war, for them to agree among themselves upon a new system of policy, and despatch the corresponding instructions to their ambassadors at Constantinople. If there had been, an attempt to interpose with violence, at the present juncture, would have rather promoted, than obstructed, the views of Russia (supposing them to be directed towards political aggrandizement and the acquisition of territory), as it would have released the Emperor from his engagements to the allies, and left him at full liberty to retain, at discretion, any or all the conquests, which it was now impossible to prevent him from making. It only remained for the ambassadors, destitute as they probably were of specific instructions, to save appearances by coming forward in the character of formal mediators, and acting as the instruments, through which Russia might dictate peace on her own terms. This part was quite a different one from that which the representatives of the same powers had generally played in the affairs of Europe down to the period of the treaty of Paris; but it was the best now left at their disposal, and they accordingly undertook and went through it in a very becoming manner.

The conditions of peace savor, pretty strongly, of the circumstances under which it was concluded. The opening of the Black Sea to the trade, not only of Russia, but of all other nations, was a demand, which, though conceived in a high and generous spirit, could not have been even proposed, excepting to a completely prostrate enemy. The privileges secured to the Russian residents in Turkey, again, are hardly consistent with the formal independence of the latter power. The emancipation of Greece, according to the treaty of July, 1826, was a matter ostensibly foreign to the causes of war, and which, in form at least, could not regularly be included among the conditions of peace. But although in this, and perhaps some other points, the treaty evidently bore the marks of a law dictated by an acknowledged superior, its terms were, nevertheless, in our opinion, not inconsistent with the supposition of a really moderate spirit on the part of Russia. It should be recollected, that this was a contest between a civilized and a semi-barbarous government, and that, after the repeated breaches of faith, and, finally, open and official avowals of falsehood by that government, it would have argued imbecility, rather than honesty, to put the least confidence in its assurances or engagements. The only way to protect the subjects and property of Russia from aggression was to place the Turks under an absolute physical incapacity of injuring them; and it seems to have been the intention of the Russian general, in drawing up the conditions of peace, to approach as nearly as possible to this point. If we compare them, not with those which are commonly agreed upon at the close of the wars between the civilized nations of Europe, but with those which Russia had it in her power to dictate, or with those which the Sultan would unquestionably have dictated, had he found himself with a victorious army at the gates of Moscow or St Petersburg, we shall not be disposed to consider them as excessively severe. The probability in fact is, that, instead of being too severe, they will prove, on experiment, to have been too lenient; that the Turks will abuse the little latitude that is left to them in such a way, as to show, that, little as it is, it is yet too much; and that future difficulties will arise on this account, which will render it necessary for Russia, before the relation of the two powers as independent states shall finally cease, to bring it still more nearly, on the part of Turkey, to that of actual subjection, than it is now.

Such, however, has been, on a general view, the progress of this brief, but important war, and of the negotiations which preceded and terminated it. We have no disposition to exaggerate the power of Russia, or to present the policy of her government under a too favorable point of view; but our impression, from a review of these transactions, certainly is, that they have tended, very evidently, to augment the influence and exalt the reputation of this already colossal state. The display of military power and talent has been, upon the whole, taking into view at once the two campaigns and the two divisions of the army, as brilliant and decisive as could have been expected, or as the nature of the case would perhaps have rendered possible that it should be. Unassisted by any active ally, and embarrassed to a certain extent by the policy of his passive ones, the Emperor has advanced to the accomplishment of his object with the same firmness, which his predecessor had exhibited when backed by the armies of the Continent and the treasures of England, and has come out of the war with equally triumphant success. The two leading generals, Diebitsch and Paskevitch, both native Russians, have done great credit to themselves and their country; and, as far as a high military reputation can be established in one or two campaigns upon a rather limited theatre, have placed their names upon a level with those of the great commanders of ancient and modern times. What is of still more importance, perhaps, in estimating the character and influence of the Russian government, the political transactions connected with and growing out of the war,—although throughout exceedingly delicate and important,—have been managed with extraordinary ability. Disclaiming as before any inclination to exaggerate, we can yet say, with perfect truth, that, in our opinion, Russia has exhibited nearly as great a superiority over the allies in the cabinet, as she certainly has over the Turks in the field of battle. On the Russian side, the tone of discussion, while it has evinced at least an equal degree of sagacity and skill in the negotiators, has been throughout more firm, manly, and consistent, than on the other. The treaty of the sixth of July, which formed the basis of all the negotiations on the part of the allies, though doubtless arranged by Mr Canning with patriotic intentions, wore on the face of it the appearance, if not of actual insincerity, at least of a tortuous policy, which attempts to overreach under the mask of friendship, stabs a rival in the

side, with an *Art thou well, my brother?* It will be said, perhaps, that cunning, approaching to fraud, on the one hand, and manly frankness, bordering at times on arrogance, on the other, are the qualities which naturally belong to the respective positions of a weaker and a stronger power, when they come into relation with each other; and this we partly believe. But at all events the facts appear to be as we have stated them. If we come down to the lower consideration of the mere clerkly skill with which the papers are drawn, the superiority is still on the same side. The important documents which were published by the Russian cabinet, at the commencement of the war, are written with great ability and discretion. They are attributed to Count Matusévitch, a young Polish nobleman, educated at the Polytechnic school at Paris, who was attached to the department of foreign affairs at St Petersburg previously to the war, and has since been employed as a special diplomatic agent at London. They certainly do great honor to their author, whoever he may have been; and although emanating from a government which places the essence of administrative talent in *action*, rather than *talking*, would by no means discredit the more experienced diplomacy of western Europe or the *logocracy* of our own dear country.

We proceed, in pursuance of the plan proposed at the beginning of this article, to offer a few suggestions respecting the influence of the events upon which we have thus briefly commented, on the situation and prospects of the political world. This influence is obviously of high and lasting importance. The direct and immediate results of the war appear to be,

1. The virtual subjection of the Turkish empire to the dominion of Russia.

2. The acquisition, by the same power, of great additional means and facilities for encouraging commerce and building up a navy.

It is quite clear, in the first place, that the conditions of the treaty, and the circumstances under which it was concluded, extend the influence of Russia over the Turkish empire as far as it could possibly be carried without an actual incorporation of the territory of the latter with her own; that they are equivalent, in their political results, to such an incorporation; and that this will be, at no very distant period, according to

the ordinary course of events, their natural and almost necessary consequence.

The Ottoman empire is of no importance in the political system of Europe, excepting as a barrier to the progress of Russia. Now its efficiency for this purpose is destroyed by the present arrangement, as completely as if its very name had been blotted from the map. In the latter case, indeed, the desired effect might have been produced, to a much greater extent, by placing the whole territory under an independent Christian government, which, with the guarantee of the allies, and the influence of a highly favorable position, would have grown up rapidly into a very powerful state, and been a much more effectual check on the Russian power, than Turkey ever has been or could possibly be rendered. By the present arrangement, the territory of the latter is divided into two unequal parts, the smaller of which is to be placed under a formally independent Christian government, while the larger is left to drag out a little longer a nominal existence in the character of the Ottoman empire. It is obvious, that, in this way, the inefficiency of the whole, for political purposes, is rendered complete. Crippled and humiliated as she now is, Turkey will of course be incapable hereafter of making any vigorous efforts in her own defence, and still more so of giving effectual aid to any alliance that may be formed in the west of Europe. While, on the other hand, the new Greek state, from the limited extent of its territory, population, and resources, will naturally take its place in the class of second or third rate powers, can have neither voice in the debates nor influence in the struggles of those of the first, and from community of religion, and of political interest as an inferior maritime power, will fall of course under the protectorate of Russia. Even this state of things, unfavorable as it is to the preservation of a balance of power in Europe, is not likely to be permanent; and when it changes it can hardly fail to change for the worse. Humiliation, like that which Turkey has now sustained, is but a prelude to complete subjugation. The pride of the Ottomans, which has only been rendered more sensitive by the entire decay of their power, will revolt at the degradation to which they are reduced, while their ignorance and fanaticism will prevent them from realizing the full extent of their weakness and the impossibility of recovery. Under these circumstances, they will naturally, we may almost say neces-

sarily, violate the obligations imposed by the treaty, and thus afford to Russia the occasion of requiring of them new indemnities and additional guarantees, until their resources are entirely exhausted, and the very name of independence finally disappears. This is the regular progress and result of such relations as those which now exist between the two countries. It was thus that Rome successively swallowed up every independent state with which she came in contact, and that Napoleon undermined the power, and finally destroyed the national existence, of all his weaker neighbors. It was in the same way, that Russia herself has gradually enlarged her possessions in every direction, until, from the somewhat limited inland territory that formed her original seat, she has extended her dominion to the borders of every ocean, and spread it over a quarter of the habitable portion of the globe. Her relations with Turkey have, in fact, been constantly tending towards this catastrophe, ever since her first appearance under Peter the Great as a European power ; and it is a curious evidence of the force of circumstances in controlling the influence of the positive combinations dependent on the human will, that, although the probability of such a result has been for a century past proclaimed by political writers, and distinctly perceived by all the cabinets of Europe,—although the policy of preventing it has been felt, acknowledged, and, as far as was practicable, acted on, during the whole of that period,—it has, nevertheless, been steadily approaching, until the occurrence of it has at length become almost a matter of certainty. The most critical moment in the history of these relations was undoubtedly that through which they have just passed. Up to this period, the essential weakness of the Turkish empire had not been fully manifested, and it appeared possible, perhaps may have been so, to sustain it as a barrier against Russia. On this head it is no longer practicable to indulge in any illusion. It is obvious to all, that Turkey, far from serving as the champion or ally of others, is no longer capable of defending herself. It would have still been practicable, as we have already intimated, by a vigorous and well directed concert among the great powers, to substitute a new creation, a young Christian state, instinct with a living principle of health, vigor, and activity, instead of the putrid corpse that now pollutes the soil and infects the air of the fairest portion of Christendom. The most judicious of the speculative writers on politics have accordingly,

for many years past, counselled the great powers to adopt this course ; but the hazard of disturbing so materially the existing state of things was probably thought too great to be encountered without an immediate and absolute necessity. The opportunity has now passed away, never probably to return ; and nothing remains for Europe, but to look on patiently and see the purposes of the Great Catharine successively accomplished, until the Russian standard is finally planted on the towers of the Seraglio, and the present or some future Constantine is actually enthroned at Constantinople.

But without anticipating on the future, it is sufficient for our present purpose to remark, that the circumstances and terms of the late pacification produced all the effect, in extending the influence of Russia and removing the only barrier to her progress in the South of Europe, which would follow from the actual conquest and complete occupation of Turkey. The other principal result of the war is, as we have stated above, the acquisition by Russia of great additional means and facilities for encouraging commerce and building up a navy. The perfect freedom and security, with which the trade to the Black Sea will now be carried on indiscriminately under all foreign flags, must give it at once a great extension, and impart a proportional impulse to the industry of the South of Russia. Her naval stations will now be placed in full and easy communication with the Mediterranean. The strait, that has hitherto in a great measure cut them off from it, will become a convenient entrance, and the government by closing or defending it when occasion shall require, may convert the Black Sea into a magnificent inland basin, where their navies may ride, repair, and exercise, without the fear of attack from any quarter. The inhabitants of the new Greek state, now comparatively at leisure to devote themselves to the peaceful pursuits for which they are best fitted, will be naturally attracted into the Russian service, and will supply the seamen and the nautical skill necessary to sustain this extended navigation. It can hardly be doubted, that Russia, under this combination of favorable circumstances, will soon become the leading maritime power in the Mediterranean, as she is already in the Baltic. By a judicious, industrious, and persevering improvement of the advantages she has thus acquired, and of those which she possessed before,—and there appears to be in the government no want of attention to this department of the pub-

lic service,—she may gradually build up a navy which may enable her to cope with the mistress of the ocean on her own domain, or, at least, to figure as an important member of any future *armed neutrality*, which the course of events may render it necessary to establish.

It would be unjust to the Russian government, and ungrateful in us, as citizens of the United States, not to notice here with particular commendation the liberal spirit, which dictated the measure of opening the Black Sea to every foreign flag, without distinction, and by the effect of which we obtain for the first time a participation in this branch of trade. It forms an agreeable contrast with the jealous and monopolizing character of the proceedings of another European cabinet, which has constantly exerted its influence with the Ottoman Porte to exclude all foreign flags, except its own, and especially that of the United States, from the trade in question. It is known that our government has been, for some years past, negotiating with the Porte on this subject, and that these negotiations have been, hitherto, defeated by the secret agency of England. The interest of Russia, now the leading maritime power in this quarter, in monopolizing the commerce of the Black Sea, appears to be at least as strong and direct as that of Great Britain; and however incredible it may appear to some persons, that nations or individuals can be actuated by any but the basest and most sordid motives, it seems hardly possible to ascribe the difference in the conduct of the two governments to any cause other than a really large and generous policy in the Russian cabinet. But whatever may have been the motive, the powers that have hitherto been excluded from the Black Sea, and in particular the United States, have certainly, for some years past, had the benefit of her coöperation in their negotiations on the subject, and are now indebted entirely to her for their success. By the treaty of Bucharest, Turkey had agreed to accept the good offices of Russia in favor of the admission of such *European* flags as had hitherto been excluded from it. At the conclusion of the treaty of Ackerman, in 1826, the phraseology of the article on this subject, which was, in other respects, copied from the former, was altered, by the substitution of the word *foreign* for *European*; and notice was given to the government of the United States, that the intention of Russia, in proposing this alteration, was, to obtain the opportunity of exercising her influence in our behalf. The early rupture of this

treaty, and the immediate occurrence of hostilities, prevented any proceedings under the article alluded to until the arrangement of the conditions of peace, among which the concession we had been seeking for was included in the ample form already mentioned, but, as we may venture to suppose, with particular reference to the case of the United States. We cannot but hope, that the noble example which has been set on this occasion may find imitators, and may tend to inspire a better spirit into the councils of the great maritime power with whom, it would be still more important for us, if the thing were possible, to maintain a cordial understanding in our commercial and political relations than it even is with Russia. In the mean time, it is the dictate of justice as well as correct feeling to render our acknowledgments where they are due, and to evince by our language, and, if necessary, our actions, that, if we are somewhat sensitive to injuries and insults, we are proportionally prompt in appreciating and requiting in kind the advances of those who are disposed to cultivate our friendship.

Such, however, are the principal direct results of the war,—the extension of the influence of Russia over the Turkish Empire,—the complete annihilation of the only immediate barrier to her farther progress in the South of Europe,—and a great augmentation of her maritime resources. The general effect is of course an important accession of political influence, and a remarkable increase of the decided preponderance which she already exercises in the great commonwealth of the Christian nations of the old world.

It is easy to imagine, that results of such consequence have been anticipated with more or less distinctness by the European politicians and statesmen, and that much time and attention have been devoted to inquiries into the means of averting the dangers that appear to impend over the independence of the Western states. The anxious deliberations of the principal cabinets have no doubt been long and often directed to this subject, but thus far, apparently, without tending to any very decisive practical conclusions. Of the purely speculative writers who have employed their pens in enlightening the world on this matter, the Abbé de Pradt is by far the most copious, and, on the whole, the most powerful and remarkable. We have placed at the head of the present article the titles of the two last of his numerous publications, mostly on contemporary general politics, which are, *The Standing Policy of Europe in regard to*

Russia, and *A Statistical Survey of Europe in reference to the Securities of her Political Liberty, for the year 1829*. The style of these, as of all his other works, is careless, abrupt, unmethodical, and has all the marks of a too rapid and hasty manner of composition ; but they also exhibit, like the rest, a large, clear, and consequently, in the main, just observation of the movements of the political world, stated in lively and not unfrequently vigorous and elegant language. His writings, of which he commonly publishes two or three every year, may be regarded, in fact, as a sort of irregular gazette, or, in the modern phrase, *periodical*, and possess the merits and defects which are naturally incident to that department of literature. His name is not unknown in this country, and the best and most elaborate of his productions, entitled *The Congress of Vienna*, has been published in a good translation by our countryman, Mr G. W. Otis. But this and his other works are less familiar to us than they otherwise would be, because they have not been much noticed or valued in Great Britain, the almost exclusive source of our information and opinions on every subject not coming within the sphere of our domestic concerns. The neglect they have met with in England is owing partly to the supercilious indifference with which the British public regard all foreign literature, and partly to the nature of the opinions of Mr de Pradt, which are not precisely of the kind best suited to the market of London. But the circumstance which prevents his works from obtaining in England the currency and attention to which they are fairly entitled, we mean their continental origin, is precisely the one which ought to recommend them particularly to us. Without intending to intimate that the continental politicians are always in the right, and those of England always in the wrong, it is quite obvious that the reverse is also not true, and that if we mean to have a correct notion of the state of Europe, we must hear both sides. The community of language and extent of intercourse between this country and England, render it impossible for us not to become familiar with the arguments that are current in that country on every subject of any importance. The case is not the same with regard to the Continent ; and it is much to be wished that editors of journals and other persons among us, who make it their business to convey political information to the public, would draw much more frequently than they do from continental sources, which are or ought to be open to them, al-

though they are inaccessible to the mass of the people. Mr Jefferson, on his return from Europe, was so much struck with the deficiency of our information in this particular, that he assisted in the establishment of a newspaper, of which it was the direct and principal object to furnish us with the views and statements of continental writers, particularly as set forth in the *Leyden Journal*, then under the conduct of Professor Luzac, and generally considered the best in Europe. Notwithstanding the rapid progress of improvement among us since that time, the deficiency still exists to as great an extent, proportionally, as it did then; and is now so generally felt, that a newspaper, instituted for a similar purpose, and ably conducted, would be received, in our opinion, with extraordinary favor. We cannot but hope that some of our intelligent editors will be induced to give their labor this particular direction.

Independently of the intrinsic value of the writings of Mr de Pradt, and that which they possess for us as indications of the opinion of the continent of Europe, they are also particularly recommended to us by the strong interest which their author has always taken in the politics of our continent, and by his frequent notice and avowed approbation of the institutions of this country. Mr de Pradt is, indeed, almost the only European writer who has undertaken to treat, in a large and comprehensive way, the vast subject of American politics, and their connexion with those of Europe. The British writers, who ought to be familiar with it, habitually avoid it, or treat it only with reference to this country, and under the influence of the narrowest prejudices, and an almost complete ignorance of facts. The continental politicians can hardly be expected to feel so much interest in it as those of England, and are necessarily still more deficient in the information required for discussing it to any useful purpose. Mr de Pradt forms, in this respect, a remarkable exception to the general characteristics of the class. He had been, as our readers are probably aware, a member of the first National Assembly, in which he voted with the Royalists; and he emigrated with the other considerable members of that party at a very early period in the progress of the revolution. His first writings were published anonymously during the interval between his emigration and the establishment of the consular government, and of course at a period when American politics attracted very little attention in Europe; but even at this time he had employed his mind upon

them, and published the result of his reflections in the work, entitled *The Three Periods in the Progress of Colonies*, in which he assigns the general causes of our revolution, and predicts that of Spanish America. Soon after the change just alluded to in the French government, he was taken into the public service by Napoleon, who appointed him his almoner or chaplain, and gave him the archiepiscopal see of Mechlin. At the close of the Russian campaign, he was acting as ambassador at Warsaw, and his account of this embassy was the first of his second series of publications. He had the good sense to adhere to the king during the ephemeral revolution of the 'hundred days,' and, on the second arrival of the allied armies at Paris, took a very important part in bringing about the return of the Bourbons. The utter neglect with which they treated him is a pleasant commentary on the boasted *gratitude* of monarchies. Finding that his services were not required in any public capacity, he resumed his pen, which he had laid aside during the period of his connexion with the government, and has wielded it ever since with so much assiduity, ability, and effect, that he has probably exercised much more influence, and obtained a much higher place in public estimation than he could possibly have done by the discharge of any official duties. He was elected a member of the House of Deputies in 1827, but was so much dissatisfied with what he considered the indecision and excessive moderation of his liberal friends, that he soon resigned his seat, and returned to his estate ; on which he is now living, at a pretty advanced age, much occupied with agriculture, which forms the subject of one of his works, but finding leisure from this healthy and honorable pursuit to write almost every year two or three books upon the political affairs of the world, which are regularly received with great attention by the reading public. A fair proportion of these are devoted to the concerns of this continent and country, and have been of material service in forming the public opinion of Europe respecting them, and giving it a direction in accordance with our interest. He has been, from the beginning, uniform and steady in his anticipations of the success of the effort for emancipation which was making by the Spanish colonies, and, thus far, his apparently sanguine views have been realized by the event. In other respects, particularly the rapid growth of the prosperity and political importance of the new-born American nations, there has been some disappoint-

ment; but we cannot permit ourselves to doubt, that even in regard to these, the large and brilliant promises of the opening of the revolution, although the payment of them has been adjourned for a time, will be ultimately satisfied. The estimate made by Mr de Pradt of the merit of individual characters is occasionally questionable, and particularly in the case of Bolivar, whom he places without ceremony quite above Washington. Indeed, his opinion of the Liberator President has been, throughout, so decidedly 'golden,' as to rouse in some minds the suspicion that it had, in fact, been 'bought' by a pension; but we have reason to believe that this report is groundless. His occasional errors in this and other points, and his faults, such as they are, of composition and substance, are probably the natural results of the same warm imagination and impetuous character which have given his writings their value and success. We regard them, on the whole, as the best series of contemporary commentaries on the politics of the last fifteen years, that have appeared in any quarter during that period.

We have introduced these remarks on the writings of Mr de Pradt for the purpose of inviting the attention of our readers to an author, who is not, we think, sufficiently known or appreciated in this country. As to his opinions on the politics of Europe, which form the immediate subject of this article, he was among the first who distinctly perceived and announced the vast accession of power which accrued to Russia at the close of the last general war. His *Congress of Vienna* may be justly regarded as a sort of text-book for inquiries into the present political system. The leading notions have been repeated with large developements and illustrations in his various subsequent publications, and particularly the two now before us. The following passage contains a rapid and lively sketch of the history of Russia for the last two or three centuries.

'The history of Russia consists of three principal periods.

'During the first, she was a purely Asiatic power, wholly occupied by her wars with the Tartars and the Poles, and a stranger to the commonwealth of Europe, where the rank of her rulers was not yet fixed, and her name even was hardly known. It was not till the war of 1756, that the imperial title, which had been assumed by Peter the Great, was acknowledged in the person of Elizabeth by France and Austria; and this acknowledgment was the price they paid for her assistance against Frederic. During this pe-

riod, the capital of Russia, which was formerly Kief, and afterwards Moscow, was, essentially, an Asiatic city.

‘During the second period, Russia advanced from Asia, under the direction of Peter the Great, and began to take part in the affairs of Europe. This monarch felt the value of his empire, and did not choose to waste his strength in obscure quarrels with his Asiatic neighbors. The scope of his ambition was higher, and the extent of his genius enabled him to attain it. Sweden was then a prominent power. She occupied the whole coast of the Baltic, and completely blocked up the passage of Russia towards the west. It was necessary to remove Sweden from the continent, and take her place. Peter succeeded in this undertaking. He was beaten at Narva, but recovered the advantage at Pultowa, which he never afterwards lost, and having banished the Swedes to their own peninsula, he took possession himself of Ingria and Livonia. Sweden fell from the elevation she had occupied under Gustavus Adolphus and Charles the Twelfth, to a third-rate power. For the purpose of securing these acquisitions, and maintaining his ascendancy in the Baltic, the conqueror of Pultowa now laid the foundation of Petersburg. Thus, in both these periods, the position of the capital has accommodated itself to the condition of the empire, and, by a singular coincidence of circumstances, it appears probable that the changes in the political condition of Russia, which belong to the third period of her history, will occasion another transfer of the seat of government, by bringing it down from the north to the south.

‘These changes are the result of the important acquisitions which Russia has made within the last century in the south of Europe. Immense regions, extending along the whole northern coast of the Black Sea, and enjoying every advantage of soil and climate, have been incorporated into her territory. Such an extension necessarily brings with it new wants, interests, and relations. Such is the fertility of these regions, that their products, if not carefully excluded by other countries, would undersell those of native growth, and condemn the whole west of Europe to barrenness. The commerce in these products is carried on upon the great rivers, the Don, the Borysthenes, and the Niesster, which, rising in the centre of the empire, take their courses towards the south, and, with the aid of canals, form a water communication between the Black and the Baltic Seas. While the economical affairs of Russia are tending to the south, it is difficult to suppose that the seat of government can remain very long in its present position; and the time is doubtless not far distant when it will be transferred to the neighborhood of the Black Sea. These regions have twice been the seat of opulence and civilization. They were covered, in ancient times, with flourishing cities,

which, as Montesquieu justly remarks, supplied Mithridates with the means of resisting so obstinately the attack of Rome. In modern days the merchants of Genoa and Pisa carried on an extensive trade in this quarter, and found it still teeming with abundant stores of wealth. The same regions are probably destined to attain a still higher degree of prosperity, in consequence of their union with Russia, which brings into this direction the trade of the whole interior of that empire.'

The following extract gives a striking picture of the vast extent and resources of the Russian dominions.

'Where does the territory of Russia commence? At the great wall of China. Where does it terminate? At the distance of only fifty leagues from Berlin and Vienna. Her right flank rests on the North Pole, and her left is protected by the Black and Caspian Seas. Is there a weak point, a dangerous neighbor, any element whatever of disunion in any part of this immense domain? None whatever. The territory is all compact and contiguous; the population of common origin, manners, language, and religion. Nor ought we to underrate the importance of the Asiatic dominions of Russia. They cost her nothing, and they furnish her with men and money. They are beginning to be civilized and to yield very valuable products. The population now amounts to fifty millions, and may be expected to increase with great rapidity. Population seems indeed to be rapidly increasing in almost all parts of Christendom, in consequence, probably, of the improvements in medicine and in the general condition of the poorer classes of the people. But the immense extent of unoccupied territory in Russia affords opportunity for a greater augmentation in the number of her inhabitants, than can easily take place in most other countries. In this respect her situation resembles that of the United States of America. It has been calculated, that, before the close of the present century, the population of the United States will exceed a hundred millions, and their progress thus far has surpassed the rate required for this purpose. There is no reason why Russia should not advance, in this respect with nearly the same rapidity; and the probability is, that her future emperors will extend their sway over a greater number of subjects than were ever before united under one sovereign. If we compare the elements of power, belonging respectively to the Russian empire and to that of Rome, we find that the former is vastly superior, in extent and compactness of territory, and in the uniformity of laws, manners, and language among its inhabitants. The subjects of Rome were bound to her by no tie but that of force, and had no principle of union among themselves. The Russians, on the other hand, are children of

the soil they inhabit, attached to it by nature, and to each other and the government by all the sympathies and associations that prevail among the members of the same community. The union of all these advantages gives to Russia the command of an almost unlimited power, which she can turn, when it suits her, against the rest of Europe. The power is already in existence. The use that may be made of it depends, in part, on the character of those who have the direction of it, and in part on the progress of events. Men, we know, are prone to abuse their advantages, and existing principles of evil are generally aggravated by the lapse of time. If the continent possessed any other state of equal force we should know where Russia was to stop; but this is not the case. And there is nothing to oppose her progress but artificial combinations, which must always contain as such the seeds of weakness, and are really no match for the same resources united under one head.'

The view here given, though pretty highly colored, is, we think, in the main, correct. We do not, however, agree with Mr de Pradt, in anticipating so rapid an increase of population in Russia, as that which we have witnessed, and which is still going on in this country. Mr de Pradt reasons on the supposition, that no condition is required for a rapid progress in this respect, other than a vast extent of unoccupied territory; but if this were the case, there is no reason why the Indian tribes who inhabit our continent, instead of dwindling into nothing, and disappearing from the face of the earth, should not advance as rapidly as the whites. The condition really necessary to a rapid increase of population is a good political and moral constitution of society. We believe that Russia will advance in this respect, because we notice a gradual improvement in the internal administration of the empire, and a tendency toward a better political and moral constitution, than that which now exists; but it will be necessary that great meliorations of this description should be actually realized and carried into practice, before her progress can ever begin to keep pace with ours.

There is more correctness in the suggestions of our author respecting the manner in which the colossal power of Russia will probably be wielded by the present and future emperors. Much no doubt depends, at any given moment, upon the disposition of the reigning sovereign; and the confidence with which the statesmen of the west of Europe appear to calculate on the moderation of the cabinet of St Petersburg, as a suf-

ficient guarantee for their independence and security, is doubtless, if we look only at the passing moment, not without foundation. But generally speaking, it is the law of nature that states should exercise power to the full extent of their internal capacities and resources, excepting so far as they are restrained from abroad; and even the temporary differences resulting, in this respect, from differences in the moral character of the reigning sovereigns or existing administrations, is, perhaps, less than we should at first thought expect it to be. If the sovereign be of an active and energetic character, he is urged forward by his own ambition; if he be quiet and scrupulous, he is forced to advance by the folly of his neighbors. The only condition upon which the state of things, existing at any given time, could be preserved, would be a perfectly correct and intelligent administration of the public affairs in all quarters. But this we know is impossible in the nature of things. Passion and error will have their influence; temporary interests come into conflict; collisions ensue; and when there is collision between stronger and weaker powers, whatever be the cause, the effect is necessarily in favor of the former. The history of Russia itself affords a remarkable illustration of the truth of these principles. Peter the Great and Catharine *le Grand*, as she was called by Voltaire, were rulers of splendid talents, boundless ambition, and little or no respect for moral principle. On the other hand, the present Emperor and his predecessor have exhibited qualities of an entirely different cast, moderate though respectable talents, amiable, unambitious dispositions, and, in general, a due regard for the rights of other nations. Yet the two latter have been carried forward, by the progress of events, into acquisitions of power and territory hardly less important than those which were made by the former. The emperor Nicholas, whose character, public and private, is thus far unclouded by a shadow of suspicion, has already, in his short reign of three years, been forced into a more important augmentation of his political influence, than was perhaps acquired by his grandmother, during her long and busy reign, with all her daring enterprise and deep, unprincipled policy. The general result is therefore determined by general causes, rather than the influence of individual character. We may remark, however, that the best course, which a really powerful state can possibly adopt for ultimately reaching the highest point of aggrandizement to which her essen-

tial resources authorize her to aspire, would be to adhere, with undeviating strictness and unfeigned sincerity, to a really just and moderate system. By this means she would avoid awakening those desperate moral reactions, on the part of weak powers, which are sometimes found to counterbalance almost any superiority of physical force ; and if her march were at times a little less rapid than it would otherwise be, she would nevertheless proceed, in the main, with far more steadiness and certainty to the object in view. A policy of this description has, for some years past, distinguished the proceedings of the Russian government. Mr de Pradt himself, notwithstanding his anxious solicitude about the influence of that power on the destiny of his own country, is in general disposed to render justice to the intentions and feelings of the late and present sovereigns and their principal ministers. The prevailing tone of his writings, in this as in every other point, is highly decorous and perfectly respectful to the powers that be. We notice, however, in particular passages, an occasional deviation from this tone, the result, probably, of a momentary movement of ill humor, not corrected by subsequent reflection, but which assumes at times a rather amusing shape, as in the following extract, where the worthy Archbishop retracts most of the eulogies which he habitually bestows upon the correct principles and excellent feelings of the Emperor Alexander.

‘Moderation is, after all, a relative quality. It does not consist in not exercising power, but often in not abusing it to the utmost point which circumstances would admit. The moderation of the Emperor Alexander was proverbial ; but it did not prevent him from acquiring Swedish Finland by the treaty of Friedericshamn, the Prussian palatinates in Poland at the peace of Tilsit, and several Austrian possessions in the same country at that of Schoenbrunn. Moderate as he was, he could yet conquer Bessarabia from Turkey ; nor did he refuse himself the kingdom of Poland, which carried forward his dominions into the very centre of western Europe. By one act of moderation after another he succeeded in obtaining everything that suited his convenience, and finally made himself master of the continent ; for such is the real state of the case, and the last result of all this moderation. Moderation, properly defined, does not consist in not keeping every foot of territory that may have been conquered, or in not killing on the spot every enemy that may have been taken prisoner. Practices like these belong only to communities in a state of barbarism. In the intercourse of civilized nations,

moderation lies in resigning such advantages as are dangerous to the safety of others ; and the moderation of the Emperor Alexander did not go this length. Two or three more examples of a moderation like his would leave but little scope in Europe for the future exercise of the same kind of virtue.'

It is no part of our plan to write the apology of the Emperor Alexander, who had doubtless, like other men, his weaknesses and faults ; but we may remark, as respects the kingdom of Poland, the most important acquisition made by that sovereign, that he had been forced into a war with France, very much against his will, by the wanton and reckless attack of Bonaparte, that he had been subjected to incalculable losses in the course of it, and that it really does not appear so unnatural, as Mr de Pradt is inclined to represent it, that he should receive, by way of indemnity, a portion of the territory which was found to be disposable at the conclusion of peace. All the other parties to the alliance obtained indemnities of the same kind in one quarter or another ; and was Russia alone, the power that had done and suffered most in the common cause, to refuse herself any advantage of this kind, merely because an acquisition of territory would render her still more dangerous to the other powers than she was before ? Such is the opinion of Mr de Pradt, who would probably, for the same reason, condemn the Emperor Nicholas for accepting large pecuniary indemnities from Persia and Turkey, at the close of his late wars with these powers, and the United States, for taking advantage of the disturbed state of Europe, and of the aggressions of foreign governments upon their commerce, to round off their territory by the addition of Louisiana and Florida. We confess that we do not carry our ideas of moderation quite to this point. On our view of the subject, the moderation of a state consists, not in abstaining from any acquisition lest in augmenting her absolute, she should also augment her relative greatness, but in making no acquisitions at the expense of the rights of others. While we keep within the limits of justice, we are not only at liberty, but bound in duty to augment, as rapidly as possible, our resources of every kind, or, in other words, to exercise and improve all the talents committed to us. The acquisition of Swedish Finland, at the expense of a weaker sovereign and a brother-in-law, was undoubtedly the most questionable of the political acts of Alexander ; but even this was the result of a war, which commenced by a wholly unprovoked

attack on the part of that brother-in-law, who has since been deposed as a maniac, and was probably such at the period when he undertook this disastrous enterprise.

But however individuals may differ respecting the credit due to Russia on the score of moderation, there seems to be but one opinion in regard to the extent of her power, its probable future increase, and the dangers with which it threatens the independence of the western nations of Europe. This being the case, the interesting question presents itself, whether nothing can be done to avert the danger. Our author seems disposed, on the whole, to consider the case as a desperate one. He repeatedly expresses the idea, announced in the above extract, that Russia is already mistress of the continent, and apparently indulges but little hope, that the sceptre can ever be wrested from her hand, either by skilful combinations or actual force. He is, however, not for giving up the point in despair, and waiting tamely for the poor satisfaction of being the last victim. On the contrary, he recommends, in the work now before us, as in all his others, a prompt and vigorous resistance to any farther progress on the part of Russia. For the easier accomplishment of this purpose, he advises the forming of a great anti-Russian confederacy, to be composed of all the other powers of Europe, and organized into a sort of standing and perpetual defensive crusade against the overpowering greatness of the common enemy. Austria and Prussia are to guard the van of this imposing alliance. France is to occupy the centre. Spain, Portugal, Sardinia, and the Italian states would constitute a strong right wing. Sweden and Denmark, on the other hand, are by no means a contemptible left; while the fleets and treasures of Great Britain would infuse a living principle of union and vigorous activity into this otherwise somewhat heterogenous body. It was also a part of the Archbishop's plan, that the allies, acting in concert, should have swept off the Turkish empire from the map, and substituted in its stead a new and powerful Christian state, occupying nearly the same extent of territory. A measure of this kind would have singularly fortified the right wing of the confederacy, and have served in a manner to turn the Russian left, and weaken considerably at this point her almost impregnable line of battle. Here, however, the Russian tactics, as often happens between a single great power and a confederacy of weaker ones, have been too rapid for the allies, or rather the Archbishop.

Instead of waiting to have their own left turned by a new Greek empire, the Russians, by their late brilliant successes over the Turks, and by pushing forward into the heart of the Mediterranean the advanced post of a small Christian state, may be said to have turned the right of the allies, and completely out-generalled them in this quarter. This omission is now past remedy, nor would the case be very much improved by the appointment of Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg to the sovereignty of Greece, which, according to the last accounts, was contemplated in the councils of the alliance. It only remains to be considered, whether the other materials, out of which the confederacy is to be organized, are sufficient to render it effective. Mr de Pradt, as we have already remarked, evidently thinks they are not, and while he counsels the most vigorous efforts, considers them all, in a great measure, hopeless. We must own, that we are very much disposed to agree with him in this view of the subject, although he has not, as we conceive, stated with perfect distinctness and precision the real ground there is for entertaining this opinion, which we shall now very briefly attempt to develop.

It is obvious, in the first place, that the only solid basis of an anti-Russian confederacy, among the western powers of Europe, is to be found in the wealth, population, and military resources of the great states of the centre of the continent, France, Austria, and Prussia. The minor powers of the north and south would serve very well, as we have intimated above, to concur in and strengthen an alliance, but could not even think of acting, excepting in aid of the abovementioned principals. Even England, notwithstanding her prodigious navy, her array of colonial appendages, and her boundless financial resources (supposing them to be still unimpaired, which is perhaps very doubtful), can make no impression on the Continent, except by enlisting one or more of the great territorial powers in her cause. She can place, from time to time, a small corps of effective troops at any point on the coast where they may be wanted, but she is essentially not a military state, and can only figure as an auxiliary in the quarrels of those that are so. The real substance of the confederacy must be, therefore, if any where, in a union of the resources of France, Austria, and Prussia. These, if they could be in fact cordially combined and brought to bear upon the object in view, would furnish an aggregate force considerably superior to that of Rus-

sia in its present condition, and quite sufficient to counterbalance it, notwithstanding the essential advantage that belongs to any single state when contending with others allied against her. If the indecision and want of concert, naturally incident to all confederacies, were the only difficulty to be got over, we should consider the cause of the allies as comparatively prosperous, or, at least, by no means desperate. But there is another defect in the condition and relations of the three great central powers, not indicated, or, at least, not much insisted on by Mr de Pradt, but which we look upon as fatal, not merely to the efficiency, but to the existence of any real confederacy among them, and not of a nature to be remedied either by the exercise of prudence and political skill, the occurrence of favorable accidents, or even the lapse of time.

The defect to which we allude has its origin in the internal dissensions which, to a greater or less extent, distract all parts of western Europe. The central seat of these divisions, and the point from which they spread themselves in all directions, through the medium of literature and personal intercourse, is undoubtedly France. The tremendous revolution which has passed over that kingdom, and which has not yet spent all its fury, has left the nation separated by divisions of opinion and interest into factions, whose quarrels are apparently irreconcilable, and are, at all events, not likely to be very soon settled. A noble zeal for liberty and improvement on the one hand, on the other a not less commendable attachment to social order and the venerable traditions of antiquity, have become, by the force of circumstances, the respective watchwords of two embittered parties, under one or the other of which is rallied almost every active member of the community. An impartial and philosophic observer can see in the opinions, feelings, and conduct of both much to approve and admire, as well as much, at times, to condemn; but, under the influence of the passions and prejudices by which they are agitated, each can see nothing in the other but deadly and inveterate enemies, engaged, from selfish views, in enterprises, which, if they succeeded, would be fatal to the prosperity of the country. These dissensions pervade, in greater or less degrees, the whole civilized world of the present day. The shadowy outline of them may be traced even in our own favored country. It is marked with more distinctness in England, and becomes important in the Netherlands and many parts of Germany; but France is

the theatre on which the struggle is really carried on in earnest, and tasks to their full extent the whole strength and spirit of the combatants. It fills all the newspapers, forms the subject of all the debates in the Chambers that are listened to with the least interest, and takes the place formerly occupied by gaming and gallantry in the brilliant saloons of the fashionable world. The contending armies are always in presence of each other, always in action, and, to judge from the duration and obstinacy of the conflict, and the frequent changes of fortune, are pretty equally balanced in point of numbers and all the elements of power. It is probable, however, that the *liberal*, or, as it is called by its enemies, *revolutionary* party, is, on the whole, very considerably superior to the other in most of the domestic materials of strength, and that it is principally by the aid of foreign influence and the terror of foreign bayonets that the *legitimate* interest maintains itself so well, and is even able, at times, to gain the ascendancy. There is no appearance of any termination, whether peaceful or violent, to the contest, and we may safely predict, that it will, at least, last out the lives of the existing generation. The present state of it at any particular moment is, however, one of the principal elements to be taken into view, in making up an opinion on the political relations of Europe ; and, as the subject is not much studied in detail in this country, it may not be wholly foreign to our purpose to notice some of the recent events that are connected with it.

In the article alluded to at the commencement of this, we took a rapid survey of the history of parties in France from the close of the war up to the change of ministry in 1827. We then mentioned that the liberal interest had, in the main, predominated during the earlier part of the reign of Louis the Eighteenth ; that partly by the great exertions of the Royalist writers, particularly Mr de Châteaubriand, and partly in consequence of the shock given to public opinion by the assassination of the Duke of Berry, the legitimate party afterwards obtained the advantage, and to such an extent, that, at the time of the accession of the present king, the number of liberal representatives in the House of Deputies was reduced to about fifteen. We added that the breach which took place between the two great Royalist leaders, Messrs de Villèle and Châteaubriand, assisted, in some degree, by the imprudence of the administration, produced, in 1827, another revolution, which brought into

the Chamber of Deputies a decided majority of members opposed to the ministry, and made it necessary for the latter to resign their places. At the time we wrote, the new administration was not completely formed, and it was generally supposed that Mr de Châteaubriand would take the place of Mr de Villèle, as President of the Council. Had this arrangement, in fact, been made, the new administration would have probably been much stronger and more durable than it has proved to be. Mr de Châteaubriand was by far the most prominent person in the opposition. His high literary reputation and great exertions in the cause of religion and royalty, together with his known attachment to the liberal principles of the Charter, had given him a great popularity; and as the immediate cause of the change in public opinion was the quarrel between him and Mr de Villèle, and his own removal from office, which was consequent upon it, it appeared but natural that, when his party recovered the ascendancy, he should himself take the place of his now ejected rival. The appointment of Mr de Châteaubriand to the Presidency of the Council, or to the Department of Foreign Affairs, would have satisfied the public, and given a character of strength and decision to the administration. But such was the aversion entertained against him by the leading Royalists and the members of the royal family, on account of what they considered his *apostacy* from the cause, that it was found impossible to persuade the king to receive him again into the Cabinet. In lieu of any other acknowledgment of his services, he was sent ambassador to Rome. The person who had been most active in bringing about the change of ministers, and who might fairly be regarded as the soul of the now dominant party, being thus virtually left out in the new arrangements, it was of course difficult to form them in a satisfactory manner, or upon any other principle than the false and pernicious one of trimming between opposite opinions. To this treatment of Mr de Châteaubriand, and to the system of organization which was the natural consequence of it, we attribute, as we remarked above, the weakness of the administration and its early dissolution. At the first meeting of the Chambers after the retreat of Mr de Villèle, there was a decided expression of feeling against him; and his administration was qualified, in the address to the king which was made by the House of Deputies in answer to his Majesty's speech at the opening of the session, with the more significant than decorous epithet of *dé-*

plorable. The appointment of the distinguished philosopher and statesman, Royer-Collard, to the Presidency of the House of Deputies, was a favorable indication of the spirit of the new ministers. These were, in general, persons of remarkable talent and much individual respectability, but, for the reason we have mentioned, were not well qualified to give complete satisfaction to either opinion, or to conduct the public affairs with energy and success. Mr Hyde de Neuville, well known in this country by his long residence among us, both in a private and public capacity, and generally esteemed, wherever he is known, as a nobleman of high intelligence and the most honorable and benevolent character, was placed in the Department of the Navy. This appointment, if anything could, would have reconciled the Royalist part of the late opposition to the omission of Mr de Châteaubriand, with whom Mr de Neuville was on terms of particular and confidential intercourse. But, as if to make this omission even more remarkable than it otherwise would have been, the place of Minister of Foreign Affairs, which, on the continent of Europe, generally carries with it the direction of the government, which was particularly important at this moment on account of the delicate and interesting aspect of the general politics of Europe, and for which Mr de Châteaubriand was especially fitted by his previous career, was given to Mr de Portalis, a legal character of distinction, who had, in early life, filled some inferior stations in the diplomatic line, but who felt so little vocation for his present employment, that he reserved for himself, during the whole time that he remained in office, a vacant seat on the bench of the highest court of justice, with the intention, which he afterwards executed, of appointing himself to it as soon as he could find himself a fit successor in the ministry. A proceeding like this, which was of course generally known and commented upon in all the newspapers, looked very much like an open declaration by the minister himself, that he regarded the present arrangement as merely temporary, and was preparing in season to secure his retreat. The most effective member of this administration was the Viscount de Martignac. He had accompanied the army, on its entrance into Spain, in 1822, as the civil commissioner of the government, and was now placed at the head of the Home Department. He exhibited extraordinary talent and resources as an extemporary debater—a rare qualification in France,—and conciliated the esteem of all by the urbanity of

his deportment ; but his influence was, in the main, entirely personal, and was, in a great measure, neutralized by his unfortunate position. The most popular member of the cabinet, because the most liberal, was Mr de Vatismenil, a young magistrate of high legal reputation, who had considerably distinguished himself by his determined opposition to the fanatical portion of the Royalists.

On the whole, the ministry might be looked upon, like most of those which have preceded it since the return of the Bourbons, as a sort of middle term between the two opinions ; and this view of their character is confirmed by the history of their proceedings and fall. No sooner had they entered on the discharge of their duties, than they found themselves assailed by a double opposition, which unceasingly harassed them during their short period of official life, and defeated all their favorite projects. The most important measure of internal policy which they attempted was a reform in the municipal organization of the kingdom. Something of this kind had been loudly called for by almost all the successive majorities, whether royalist or liberal, that had appeared in the House of Deputies for several years preceding, and by almost every individual of distinction who was in the habit of expressing his opinion in public on political affairs. The Royalists had urged it because they regarded a powerful municipal organization as an aristocratic element, which would tend to strengthen the constitution at a point where they thought it most defective. The other party, contemplating a highly popular form of municipal authority, anticipated from the same cause a reinforcement of the democratic principle. For one reason or another, the measure appeared to be the object of general desire and favor. The minister, therefore, probably thought that he was meeting the views of all parties, and doing a highly acceptable thing, when he introduced his two detailed and elaborate bills, containing together a complete municipal organization of the whole kingdom, excepting the city of Paris, which was specifically reserved to be made the object of a distinct law. If such were his expectations, they were destined to meet with a most complete disappointment. It would be foreign to our purpose to examine the details of the measure in question, which doubtless contained many wise provisions, and had it been adopted, might perhaps have done much good. In its general aspect and spirit it wore, like the cabinet by which it was formed, the

appearance of an attempt to reconcile the views and interests of both the opposite parties, and, as usually happens in such cases, it satisfied neither. Although both parties wished for the adoption of some system of municipal organization, they wished it for directly opposite reasons; and the measure would have been worse than useless to each, unless the details had been digested in conformity with its own principles. When the bills of Mr de Martignac came under the consideration of the House, instead of pleasing every body, they were found in fact to please almost nobody. The Royalists thought them too popular, and the popular party thought them too aristocratic. The committee to which they were referred amended them so much that they were hardly to be recognised. When they were taken up for debate, scarcely an individual, if we recollect rightly, excepting the officers of the crown, said a word in their support; and, finally, when the preliminary question was taken, which exhibited the feeling of the House on the subject, it appeared to be almost unanimous against them. This result, so adverse to all his sanguine calculations, completely unsettled for a moment the philosophy of Mr de Martignac, and even ruffled the smooth surface of his temper. After the question to which we have alluded had been taken, and gone against him, he suddenly quitted the House while the debate was going on, and returned in about ten minutes with a royal order for withdrawing the bills. This proceeding was rather too hasty to be quite decorous, and also brought a little too directly before the public view the movement of the wires by which the king is made to act in a constitutional monarchy. Thus unsuccessfully and ingloriously terminated the only attempt at any important measure of domestic policy which was made by this short-lived administration.

Their success in managing the foreign relations of the kingdom was not much greater. They took up the general policy of Europe at the point where it was left by the battle of Navarino. But in the few months which had since elapsed, public opinion had been distinctly pronounced upon the character of that event. When the first flush of triumph which naturally swelled every Christian heart at so signal a victory over an infidel enemy had subsided, it was easily seen, that however natural it might be for a British Admiral to attack any fleet, whether friendly or hostile, with which he came into contact, and however politic in Russia to concur, in this instance, in

such a proceeding, the destruction of the Turkish navy was by no means a result that came within the scope of the policy of western Europe. The battle of Navarino had accordingly been declared by the King of Great Britain to be an *untoward* incident, and it was obviously still more unpropitious in its effects on France, since, while it increased, on the one hand, the general political preponderance of Russia, it also confirmed, on the other, the maritime ascendancy of Great Britain, and thus diminished, in both its chief elements, the relative importance of the third party to the alliance. This view of the subject had already become general; and, as the Emperor of Russia finally declared war against the Turks at about the time when the new ministry came into power, the policy of doing nothing which might diminish the influence of Turkey became still more obvious than it was before. Notwithstanding all this, the French ministers, immediately after their entrance into the cabinet, planned and carried into effect a measure of precisely the same general tendency with the attack on the Turkish fleet. We allude to the expedition of ten or fifteen thousand troops which they sent into Greece, under General Maison, for the purpose of compelling Ibrahim Pasha to evacuate the country and return to Egypt. The immediate objects of the expedition were accomplished with honor; and the measure itself, considered simply in reference to its operation on Greece, wore the aspect of a generous interference in behalf of a suffering Christian community. Politically viewed, it was simply an armed diversion in favor of Russia, and was of course directly opposed to the general policy of the western powers. It is understood to have been suggested and proposed by France, and to have been but slightly encouraged by Great Britain. It burdened the French finances with a loan of eighty million francs, for the purpose of effecting an object which that power, had she better understood her interest, should have made any reasonable sacrifice to defeat. It is not easy to account for the adoption of such a measure by the French government, except by supposing that the frequent revolutions in the cabinet, and the constant war of parties which was going on within the kingdom, had diverted the attention of the leading statesmen from the foreign relations, and prevented them from forming any distinct notions on the subject. It is pretty evident, indeed, from the tone of the leading French journals, of all colors, that public opinion, probably from the intense and absorb-

ing interest that is felt in domestic occurrences, and the consequent comparative disregard of those which concern the general politics of Europe, has not yet accommodated itself to the altered state of the balance of power. The old feeling of jealousy of Great Britain is still apparently predominant especially with the liberal politicians; and Mr de Pradt, as far as we are informed, is almost the only prominent individual of this class who has distinctly perceived and announced the expediency of a good understanding with England, for the purpose of forming a counterpoise to the preponderance of Russia. In the absence of any very decided system respecting the general politics of Europe, the French ministry were probably carried away by a chivalrous and in itself highly natural and generous sentiment of sympathy with the sufferings of the Greeks, and zeal in their behalf, into this expedition, a measure evidently not less *untoward* than the battle of Navarino.

The other principal measure, connected with the foreign policy of the kingdom, was the war with Algiers. This was probably in itself just and politic, but was carried on with so little energy and effect, that it did not greatly increase either the reputation of the French marine, or the strength of the administration.

Constructed on the essentially vicious principle of a compromise between two opinions, constantly harassed in consequence by a double opposition, and not enjoying the adventurous aid that might have been obtained from a highly energetic and successful conduct of the public affairs, it was easy to perceive, that the ministry was not destined to a very long period of official life. During the second session of the Chambers, which was held after their introduction into power, it was remarked, that the Prince de Polignac, then ambassador at London, made frequent journeys backward and forward between the place of his residence and Paris, and the conclusion was drawn by the public, although earnestly denied by the ministerial prints, that new arrangements were making in which this nobleman was to figure as a principal character. The event verified their conjecture. The recomposition of the ministry was purposely deferred till the close of the session, in order to avoid the violent reaction against it, that would certainly have been exhibited by the Chambers; but within a few weeks after they had adjourned, an entire change was made in the administration, and a new one was formed of

which the Prince of Polignac, who was placed in the department of foreign affairs, was regarded as the leader.

The elevation of this nobleman to the head of the government is supposed to have been the principal object of this revolution. He had long been a confidential friend of the king, who was particularly solicitous to have him about his person, and, provided this arrangement were made, was comparatively indifferent to the character or political coloring of the other ministers who were to be associated with him. It is accordingly understood, that Mr de Polignac, who, although from habit, principle, and family connexion, an uncompromising Royalist, was still sensible of the strength of the liberal party and the necessity of conciliating it as far as possible, addressed himself, in the first instance, to some of the prominent members of that party and proffered them places in the cabinet. These persons, conceiving that they could not with propriety serve under a leader with whom they did not agree in principle, declined the proposal. It was then, as a last resort, that Mr de Polignac turned to the extreme right, and composed the ministry out of the most decided and violent section of the Royalists. The change was announced in the newspapers of the eighth of last August; and never, perhaps, was a similar piece of intelligence received with a louder or more universal burst of surprise and indignation. Mr de Polignac, as an individual, was not perhaps regarded as particularly objectionable, although his long residence in England and supposed preference of English manners and principles was but a slender recommendation of him to the mass of the French people. But he was looked upon rather as a courtier of the old school, than as a bigoted partisan. He was in fact regarded merely as the formal leader of the ministry. The direction of affairs was supposed to be in the hands of the Count de Labourdonnaye, a nobleman of excellent personal character, but well known and familiarly cited as precisely the most violent *ultra* in France. He had been for years the rallying point of what was called the *counter or royalist opposition*, and had kept himself aloof from the *deplorable* ministry of Mr de Villèle, under the idea that it was not sufficiently orthodox. He had also uniformly been a partisan of rigorous measures of administration as well as of exaggerated principles of government, and, in the earlier periods of the restoration, had gained a sinister sort of distinction by insisting on the adoption of a harsher

mode of treating the political offenders of the day. The speeches he had made at that time were now reprinted, and some unfortunate passages, in which he had called for *more blood*, were particularly pointed out to the public attention. The other ministers, though mostly Royalists of the same school, were men of little note, and of course not personally odious; but the mere name of *Labourdonnaye* gave a character to the administration, which no one at all acquainted with the political situation of France could mistake for a moment. A few persons, who agreed with him in opinion, and thought that the only means of rescuing France from the brink of an impending revolution was to adopt an entirely new course of policy, hailed his appointment with high satisfaction. The much more numerous class of moderate men were struck with alarm, and the still larger party of the professed friends of liberty were thrown into a transport of political frenzy. In fact, whatever may be thought of the characters and principles of the rival statesmen of France, it is not easy to see on what calculation the government expected to be able to sustain an arrangement so diametrically opposite to the opinion of the country. In about six months the Chambers were to assemble; it was impossible that more than a fifth or at most a quarter of the members of the House of Deputies could rally under the banner of *Labourdonnaye*, and, with a majority of three quarters against them, it appeared palpable that the ministry could not survive the first day of the session. It was evident that the address of the House in answer to the king's speech at the opening must sweep them at once from their places. If, on the other hand, in order to prevent this result the house should be dissolved and an appeal made to the people, it was quite certain that, in the present heated and disturbed state of the national feeling, the elections would all be carried by the liberal party, and that the new House would be still more unanimous against the government than the old one. Reasoning upon these obvious and simple combinations, and taking into view the known decision of Mr de *Labourdonnaye*, the public began to entertain the opinion that it was his intention to adopt some violent unconstitutional measure,—in the French phrase, some *coup d'état*,—for the purpose of maintaining and restoring the royal authority. It was expected that he would suppress the charter, levy the taxes by a royal order, abolish the liberty of the press, and, in short, revive the absolute monarchy in all its glory. Such,

or something like this, was in fact, as we incline to think, the plan of this minister ; and if he did not attempt the execution of it while he remained in power, it was probably because he was fettered by the timidity and irresolution of his colleagues. So general indeed was the expectation of some such proceeding, that the people began to concert among themselves as to the measures which it would be proper to adopt in such a contingency. An association was formed in Brittany, whose members signed a paper binding themselves to stand by each other in openly resisting the payment of any tax that might be levied without the consent of the Chambers. It was curious too to see how, at this critical moment, the friends of liberty rallied round the venerable citizen who has distinguished himself so remarkably through a long life, as her champion in the old and new worlds. Lafayette was upon a journey through the south of France when the change of ministry took place. He had been received with a cordial welcome and many demonstrations of attachment and respect in the principal cities through which he had passed, before this event was announced. Immediately after, the expression of public opinion assumed a new character. The people appeared to be electrified, and from this time forward till he reached Paris on his return, the journey of the 'Nation's Guest' became a sort of triumphal progress, not unlike that which he had made through the United States five years before. At Lyons, in particular, one of the principal second-rate cities in France, there was an extraordinary display of enthusiasm, and the addresses to and answers of the aged apostle of freedom breathed a spirit not unworthy of '76. In the mean time the two sections of the ministerial party rallied again as an opposition under their former leaders. Mr de Châteaubriand resigned his embassy, although he sacrificed, in so doing, his only means of support. The *Journal des Débats* and the other principal newspapers opened their batteries upon the ministry, and, without being discouraged by a number of prosecutions for libel and sedition that were instituted against them, kept up a most vigorous and animated fire. All things, in short, returned to the same state in which they had stood at the time when Mr de Villèle had been compelled to retire, with the difference that the administration was still more obnoxious and the opposition still more violent than in 1827.

The government did not venture, however, on this occasion,

to appeal to the people as they had done before. The result of the former experiment held out, in fact, but slender encouragement to a repetition of it, and, there being no other alternative remaining, the violent party gave way. Hardly three months had elapsed after the formation of the ministry, when the Count de Labourdonnaye resigned his place as minister of the home department, and at the same time the Prince de Polignac was raised to the presidency of the Council. This change altered very considerably the tone and character of the administration, and brought it nearly back to the intermediate and undecided state, in which it stood under M. de Martignac and his colleagues. The new ministry, like the former, will doubtless be attacked by the Royalist opposition, which has uniformly rallied under Mr de Labourdonnaye, and being nevertheless a shade deeper in its royalism than the preceding one, will be still more obnoxious to the professedly liberal party. Such was the situation of the internal politics of France at the last accounts, but it is not improbable that other changes may occur, even before this article shall have passed through the press.* The Chambers were to assemble about the first of February, and it is not easy to see how the administration, although purged of some of its most unpopular elements, will stand this ordeal, nor yet to imagine, in the midst of this struggle of contending and almost equally balanced opinions and parties, what new bias the government can take.

Such, however, has been the fluctuating and undecided situation of the French ministry, during the whole period of the late war between Russia and Turkey; a period when the general politics of Europe have been in a highly critical posture, and when it was of extreme consequence to France, that she should exercise, to its full extent, all the influence that she is, under any circumstances, capable of exerting. The mere narration of these events illustrates, far more strikingly, than any general observations which we could offer on the subject, the disastrous operation of party divisions on the political importance of the kingdom and on the balance of power. Other communities, more favorably situated than that of France, but which are yet not entirely exempt from this evil, might

* From accounts received since the above was written, it appears that the Chambers have been summoned for the tenth of March. This will of course be the time when we are to look for a new political movement, should any in fact occur.

learn wisdom from her example, if it were possible, as it is not, for men strongly agitated by party spirit, or any other violent passion, to learn wisdom from anything. The political revolution, which brought into power the Polignac ministry, nearly coincided in time with the passage of the Balkan by the Russians. The latter was an event of portentous interest to Europe. It was parallel in character and similar in its consequences to the crossing of the *Rubicon* by Cæsar; while the question, whether the orders of the king of France should be countersigned *Polignac* or *Martignac*, apart from the passions that had become connected with these names, was of no more importance than the celebrated problem which divided the statesmen of Lilliput. But, under the unnatural excitement of the moment, this party controversy occupied exclusively the whole attention of the public, flowed from every tongue, and spread itself at large over the columns of all the newspapers; while the progress of General Diebitsch was crowded into a corner, where it figured as a chance paragraph of two or three lines, and was probably overlooked by half the readers. The liberal politicians, indeed, were so much carried away by their bitterness against *Milord* Polignac, as they called him, who was suspected of entertaining British prejudices and partialities, that they actually appeared to rejoice in the progress of Russia, from an opinion that it would be disagreeable to England and her representative in the French cabinet.* It is impossible not to see, in these senseless and almost ludicrous disputes about trifles to the neglect of the deepest interests, a repetition, on a larger scale, of the madness of the Jews of old, who were slaughtering each other in the streets, in civil wars about their respective pretensions to the priesthood, while the Roman enginery was battering the walls and thundering at the gates of Jerusalem; or of that of the Greeks of Constantinople, who employed themselves in discussing the Nestorian and Eutychian heresies, when the green standard of *Islam* was already planted on the shores of the Bosphorus.

If the effects of the dissensions, which we have now de-

* 'If the conflict [between Russia and Great Britain] commence, our wishes, as Frenchmen, will be for Russia; for the Colossus of the Pole menaces us less than the Colossus of the main.'—*Constitutionnel de Paris*.

See the article from which this extract is taken, translated in the 'Boston Daily Advertiser' for February 26.

scribed, on the welfare and political importance of France, are sufficiently disastrous, they are, if possible, still more fatal to the balance of power among the great states of Europe. The only solid basis, as we have already remarked, for a confederacy of the western powers for the purpose of resisting the further progress of Russia, must be looked for in a strict and cordial alliance between the three governments of France, Austria, and Prussia. But while France is thus agitated by party divisions; while the liberal, or, as it is considered and called by its enemies, the *revolutionary* interest, is the one which, on the whole, maintains the ascendancy in her councils, it is impossible that she can appear, to the governments of Austria and Prussia, in any other light than as a sort of political volcano in a state of permanent eruption, constantly threatening the safety and even existence of all the neighboring nations. Far from forming any concert or alliance with France, the great object of Austria and Prussia is to escape from her influence, and, as a means of obtaining this end, to keep as much aloof as possible from any connexion with her. The danger from this quarter is immediate and pressing; and, in looking round for aid in repelling it, they naturally turn their eyes to Russia, as a powerful state, which has, in this respect, a common interest and fellow-feeling with them. They know that the power of Russia, should it continue to increase as it has done, may be ultimately dangerous to their independence, but this is a remote and uncertain peril, compared with that which they apprehend from France and which is already imminent. A confederacy with Russia against France, and not with France against Russia, is therefore the necessary policy of these two great powers, and has been for many years, is now, and will doubtless long continue to be their actual one. This confederacy was regularly and publicly organized under the name of the *Holy Alliance*, which, whatever may have been the theory of its original concoction, became in practice a combination of three powerful, arbitrary governments against the inroads of the principle of *liberty*, which could only come to them, if it came at all, in the form of *revolution*. This alliance, it has sometimes been said, was virtually dissolved by the death of the Emperor Alexander, and has not since been revived; but the truth is, that nothing can dissolve it while the causes which gave it existence continue to operate. As long as the principle of liberty is active in

the west of Europe, so long will the Holy Alliance flourish in the east; and as there is a great probability from present appearances, that the cause of free government is gaining strength in the west, it follows of course, that the cabinets of Austria and Prussia will be rather disposed, for many years to come, to strengthen and consolidate their connexion with Russia, than to combine with France against her.

There is not, therefore, nor can there ever be, in the nature of things, any real confederacy of the great western states against the power of Russia. The only contingency upon which this could happen, would be the triumph of liberal principles of government in Austria and Prussia, and it was with this understanding of the subject, that Napoleon, as we are told by Mr de Pradt, was accustomed to affirm, that, in fifty years, Europe would be either Cossack or Republican. *Dans cinquante ans l'Europe sera Cosaque ou Républicaine.* The meaning was, that Russia would infallibly extend her empire over the whole west of Europe, unless the principle of liberty should exhibit itself with so much vigor in that quarter, as to afford a moral counterpoise to her immense superiority of physical force, in which case it would substitute, for the traditional monarchical establishments that now exist, the pure and simple forms of a republic. But the triumph of liberal principles of government in Austria and Prussia, though certainly within the compass of possibility, does not appear at present a very probable occurrence. Any tendency towards it, which might become alarming, would in fact be checked at once by the interference of Russia herself, who, according to the tenor of the Holy Alliance and the usage under it, would be immediately called on, and would of course be ready to lend her aid for this purpose. The only combination that could be formed in the west of Europe on liberal principles, must, therefore, be composed of France, England, and the minor northern powers; since those of the south, Spain, Portugal, Sardinia, and the Italian states, would be much better disposed to join Russia in a crusade against revolution, than France and England in one against Russia. But a coalition of France and England with the minor northern powers would furnish a very insufficient counterpoise to the colossal greatness of Russia, backed by the substantial make-weights of Austria and Prussia, and the minor powers of the south. The attempt to institute such a coalition would only draw still tighter the bonds of

the Holy Alliance, provoke the jealousy of other governments, and counteract the objects it was intended to effect. There is but little probability, therefore, that a confederacy on this or any other scheme will ever be attempted ; and the chance is, on the contrary, that Russia will be left for the next thirty-five as she has been for the last fifteen years, to extend her empire as circumstances may appear to render it necessary or expedient, without molestation from any quarter. By the end of that period, if the oracle of Bonaparte be true, there will be but little scope left for further extension.

‘Sistimus hic tandem ubi nobis defuit orbis.’

The form in which Russia will probably exercise her influence and extend her empire over other states, is treated by Mr de Pradt in a separate chapter. His reasoning is not remarkably precise or powerful ; but as all these questions are of a novel and interesting character, the reader may perhaps be amused with an extract.

‘It may perhaps be inquired how Russia will exercise this preponderance, which we consider so alarming. Will she have her Proconsuls, like ancient Rome ? Will she send out new Repnins and Kaiserlings like those she formerly despatched to Poland ? Will she place another Biren here, and a second Poniatofsky there ? or will she, like Napoleon, dethrone the existing dynasties and substitute princes of her own in their stead ? The answer to all these questions is very easy and simple.

‘The power already exists, and it is in the nature of man to exercise, perhaps to abuse, all the power he possesses. Wars are quite as often the result of the intrigues of courtiers, as of sound policy, or even the ambition of the Prince. Moderation is not an absolute but a relative term, and only means, in many cases, that you do not push your advantages to the last extremity. To yield something that you might retain is considered real moderation. If, then, Russia, at the close of the war with Turkey, occupy only a part of the territory which may be at her disposal, she will receive the praise of exemplary moderation. But it is not the less certain that she will have obtained a great increase of her already excessive power, and that other powers will be relatively weaker in the same proportion. Apply the same principle to Austria and Prussia. Let us suppose that they, too, should fail, as they certainly would, in a contest with Russia, and that the latter were to appropriate to herself only a portion of the spoils. Here would be great moderation, but there would be also, at the same time, a great relative increase of power on the one hand, and diminution

of it on the other. Let us even go farther, and suppose that Russia, in the exercise of a sort of generosity, of which there are yet but few examples, shall absolutely renounce all increase of territory. Still her immense power remains, and necessarily carries with it a kind of virtual supremacy. Already, before anything is resolved upon by any other government, the first question is, What will be thought of this at St. Petersburg? Now this is, essentially, dependence and subjection; this is precisely the state into which Europe had fallen in the time of Napoleon, when the whole continent was constantly occupied in watching his motions and studying his countenance. Immense efforts were made by Europe for the purpose of throwing off this humiliating yoke, but another, far more difficult to break, is already fastened on her neck. It is not improbable that this new authority may be exercised, for a time, with all the forms of the most polite usage, but it will not be for that reason the less real. Russia may not perhaps, like ancient Rome, order her ambassadors to insult foreign sovereigns at their own courts—command one to make war, and another to make peace—attempt to settle the domestic concerns of royal families, or declare her allies inviolable; but a look from her will carry terror, her intimations will be regarded as orders, and her displeasure felt as a disgrace and a misfortune. Such is the mildest form in which the supremacy of Russia over Europe can possibly be exercised. The pride of the western politicians may lead them to affect to doubt the reality of this state of things; but their unwillingness to acknowledge it does not alter the case, which the lapse of a few years will make but too plain to every one.'

These remarks furnish, probably, a pretty correct description of the manner in which Russia does and will *exercise* her influence over the rest of Europe. The question of the form in which she will *extend* her empire is not touched upon, an omission owing probably to the absence, which we have already remarked, of any distinct notion, on the part of our author, of the connexion between the party divisions of the western nations, and the general political situation of Europe. Should these divisions continue to rage as they have done—and there is certainly no present prospect of any abatement of their violence,—they must, after a while, in the regular course of things, produce new convulsions, which will require and, according to their views of their rights and interests, justify the armed intervention of the eastern powers; that is, in substance, of Russia. Such an intervention, however moderately conducted, would necessarily occasion an augmentation of power, and, ultimately, of territory. This was the form in which Russia

extended her dominion over Poland; and was also, in substance, the character of the much more justifiable transactions which terminated the wars of the French revolution. Should the motives which influence human conduct continue to be the same as they always have been, the future history of Europe must necessarily offer, from time to time, a repetition of similar scenes, which will of course be attended with the same practical results. *Divide and conquer* is the well-known and acknowledged principle of all success. In this case, the division already exists, and exists on points which render it interesting, and, by possibility, dangerous to foreign governments. The latter are, consequently, authorized, and indeed required, to take it into view in determining on the course of their policy. Without attributing to any party any other intentions than such as naturally result from their respective positions, it is impossible not to foresee, that Russia must, indirectly or directly, take a part in these controversies, and that she cannot take a part in them without deriving from such interference an augmentation of influence, and ultimately of territory, exactly proportional to the extent to which it may be carried. Such appears to us to be the precise form in which Russia will probably extend her empire over the west of Europe.

In comparing the present situation of Europe with the state of things half a century ago, it is curious to see how few substantial and permanent alterations were effected by the events of the French revolution. That political tornado shook to their foundations almost all the institutions and governments that came within its influence, and unsettled everything so completely, that it seemed at the time quite impossible that the same elements could ever coalesce again in the same or any similar shapes. No sooner, however, had the tempest spent its fury, and the lapse of a few years permitted the materials of power to gravitate into their natural positions, than we find, under a good many modifications of minor parts, the great features of the structure of the commonwealth of Europe differing very little from what they were before. Austria and Prussia stationary,—France comparatively declining,—England and Russia, more especially the latter, the objects of general apprehension and interest;—such was the outline of the political system before the revolution, and such, a little more distinctly marked, is its outline now. If we look into the article on Russia in the celebrated work of Favier on the *Policy of the Cabinets of Eu-*

rope, written about the year 1775, we find him drawing at the close the following conclusions, which vary only in the form of expression from those of Mr de Pradt, and which, if we did not know their origin, would appear to be borrowed from some contemporary publication.

‘From all that we have here stated,’ says Favier, ‘it follows—

‘1. That Russia holds a victorious and menacing attitude towards all her neighbors, and is quite capable of maintaining the existing military establishment to which she owes her success.

‘2. That her alliance with the Court of Vienna and the King of Prussia places her in the very best position as respects her foreign connexions.

‘3. That of the three great powers who might have checked her advances on Turkey, she has nothing to fear from Austria and Prussia, who are in alliance with her, and very little from France, who rather seems to court her friendship.

‘4. That she will, accordingly, find herself free from any obstacles to the accomplishment of her designs on the Porte; that she will undoubtedly dictate the terms of peace, and that the influence of France, formerly so powerful in that quarter, will be quite unimportant.

‘5. That if her revenue be not proportional to her territorial extent, and her extraordinary resources be also inferior to those of some other states, she is still able to command funds ample enough, at least, for the two next campaigns, and that this length of time will be sufficient for the accomplishment of the projects in which she is now engaged.

‘6. That while she enjoys all these advantages for carrying into effect her military and political schemes, we can hardly flatter ourselves that we shall be able to divert her from them by mere persuasion.

‘7. That the method of negotiation should have been attempted in the first instance, in concert with England, for the purpose of stopping her progress towards the Mediterranean; but that if it was then not made, or made ineffectually, there is very little chance that it will succeed better at present.

‘8. That a prompt appeal to force would have been the only certain and practicable means of checking the torrent, or moderating its violence; but that such an appeal could only have had effect in proportion as it was unexpected, sudden, and vigorous, and that no demonstration whatever should have been made unless it was determined to push matters to the last extremity.’

All this applies substantially, and, in general, literally, to the present situation of Russia and of Europe. The subsequent

progress of the former in power and influence is briefly indicated in a note which Mr de Segur, in his edition of the work here cited, places at the end of the article from which the above is extracted. The note was written about the year 1825. His views coincide, in the main, with those which we have ventured to suggest, although we differ from him as to the probability of a coalition of constitutional powers against the progress of Russia.

‘Russia,’ says he, ‘has been gradually advancing ever since the period described in the text, and has now become a colossal power. Her weight in the political balance is immense; almost the whole of Poland is subject to the sceptre of her sovereigns. The vast armies of France, after being stopped in their victorious career by the conflagration of Moscow, perished amidst the snows and storms of her inhospitable climate. Her own armies, on the other hand, after overrunning, on various occasions, Germany, Holland, Switzerland, and Italy, succeeded at last, by the aid of a general coalition of the other powers, in penetrating to the capital of our hitherto victorious monarchy. Russia is now at the head of a new federative system; she presides, if we may so speak, over the *Holy Alliance*, that unexpected league, in which interests, that before appeared irreconcilable, are now, for a time at least, united in the closest connexion. The apprehension of new revolutions forms the cement of this alliance. For the moment its policy is pacific. But who can foresee the future results of the concerted action of this imposing triumvirate, of which England alone has hitherto maintained an active independence? Would it be too much to predict that the force of circumstances will create another new federative system of an opposite character, and that a league of constitutional governments will be formed in the west of Europe as a counterpoise to this Eastern alliance of absolute monarchies?’

We have left ourselves but little room to treat the question of the influence of the war, and its results on the interest and policy of the United States, and must dispose of this part of the subject in a very summary way. The general outline of the foreign policy of our country is familiar to the public mind. The commercial rivalry which exists between the United States and England, and which affects, at times, to a certain extent, the character of their political relations, creates of course an indirect relation of an opposite kind between us and the great continental powers, to whom we should naturally look for aid on the occurrence of a difficulty in the other quarter. Hence, although our intercourse with England is much more

extensive and important than with the Continent, we are still accustomed to regard the nations of the Continent as our political allies, and England as a political enemy. These relations, which grow out of the nature of things, have been strengthened and confirmed by the progress of events, and may be traced through all the successive periods of our history. They formed in particular the principle of the important aid which we received from France in the war of the revolution. It may be remarked, however, that, during the stormy period which has since intervened, the French government have not unfrequently lost sight of the character of those relations, and of their true policy in regard to the United States. Even at the present moment, and in a somewhat more consolidated and tranquil state of the kingdom, their obstinate refusal to take into serious consideration our important claims upon them, of which they do not even venture to deny the justice, is not perhaps in strict conformity with the line of conduct which should naturally be adopted towards a useful political ally. The same causes, however, which establish a friendly relation between us and France, also create one of a similar kind with Russia, which may, in like manner be traced, through the whole course of our history from the period of the Armed Neutrality up to the present day. The importance of this relation is constantly increasing with the progressive increase of Russia in power and influence; and as this increase also modifies considerably the international relations of the great powers of the west of Europe, and renders France and England allies instead of rivals, it naturally affects at the same time the general character of our foreign policy, and will, ultimately, lead us to look to Russia instead of France as our principal political ally. The difference between the forms of government of the two powers is of no importance in this respect, because, having no point of contact, they cannot possibly be dangerous to each other. We consider it as a strong proof of the ability with which the statesmen of Russia have managed the affairs intrusted to them, that they have distinctly perceived the true character of their relations with us, and have acted throughout in conformity with it, although some mistakes would perhaps have been excusable in regard to a country forming so completely, as we do, the antipodes of theirs, both in geography and politics. They have certainly displayed, in this branch of their foreign relations, far more sagacity than the French, who have hitherto claimed the

superiority over all other nations in diplomatic skill. The extravagant pretensions, blundering incapacity, and wanton violence of the successive rulers of France during the last forty years, have at times completely vitiated, and throughout rendered doubtful, the nature of our position in regard to that power. Even now, as we have already remarked, she denies us what she has herself admitted to be strict justice. From Russia, on the other hand, we have received a series of good offices, uninterrupted by any act or demonstration of an opposite character, and crowned within the last few months by the spontaneous and disinterested gift of a ticket of admission to the Black Sea. It is not in the nature of men or nations to be insensible to such a course of proceeding. It has been and will doubtless continue to be reciprocated by the government of the United States on every proper occasion, and will completely establish the friendly relation which is naturally created by the respective positions of the two powers in regard to Great Britain. It may be proper to add, for the satisfaction of those persons who are sure to misunderstand whenever there is a possibility of misconstruction, that when we speak of Great Britain as a political rival or enemy, we do not mean that it is for our interest to be on bad terms with her. By a political rival or enemy is meant a power with which we are, from the force of circumstances, in greater danger of coming into collision than with any other. Such a power is of course precisely the one with which it is for that very reason most important for us to be on good terms, and which we ought to use every effort and make every reasonable sacrifice to conciliate. Such has in general been, and we trust always will be, however at times imperfectly reciprocated, the character of our proceedings towards the British government.

Such, however, being the general outline of our foreign policy, and in particular of our relations with Russia and Great Britain, it follows of course that every augmentation of the influence of the former power may be regarded by us, looking at the subject merely under a political point of view, as a favorable occurrence. As friends of the cause of freedom and civilization, we may regret that a purely military and despotic government should be gradually gaining on the constitutional monarchies of the west of Europe. But we have, after all, not much faith in the value or permanence of these *mixed modes*, which seem to be, as they have been in fact described by

some of the most distinguished European writers as a sort of mongrel system, growing up naturally in the course of the transition from one simple form to another, but not containing in themselves any principle of vitality or permanent existence. It would perhaps be as well for the western nations of Europe to be under the influence of a stable and well-administered simple monarchy, as to be disturbed by the perpetual and organized war of parties, that belongs to the essence of a compound one. At all events, since Europe, according to Bonaparte, must be either Republican or Russian, and since there is, from present appearances, no great probability that the former part of the alternative will be realized, we must make the best of the latter. If we regret on the one hand that a nation, whose political forms and constitution differ so much from our own, is rapidly increasing in influence, we may console ourselves on the other with the reflection that her power, however great it may become, is not attended with danger to this country, and can only affect us, if at all, in a favorable way.

We shall perhaps be charged on this occasion as we have been on some preceding ones of a similar kind, with exaggerating the greatness of Russia, and with entertaining 'nervous terrors' of her future progress. What is meant by 'nervous terrors' of the progress of a power which we have uniformly looked upon and represented as our principal political ally, we must leave it for those to explain who make the charge. We should as soon have expected to be accused of entertaining individually 'nervous terrors' that one of our best friends would marry an accomplished and beautiful wife with a large fortune, or draw the highest prize in the lottery. As respects the imputation of exaggerating the greatness of Russia, and its probable increase, we cannot but remark that our critics, instead of vaguely denying the correctness of our representations, would perhaps better subserve the cause of truth by indicating with precision the errors contained in them. Enjoying some advantages for a comprehensive view of the political field, we have habitually published our impressions with perfect sincerity, and, as far as we are conscious of our motives, without 'fear, affection, or hope of reward.' They have been for the most part merely statements of fact, which may be easily verified by references to the map or the statistical table. We have occasionally, though somewhat sparingly, hazarded opinions and conjectures as to the present and future political situation of the

world. In their general scope, the sentiments we have expressed coincide with those of the most enlightened politicians and statesmen of Europe for fifty years past, as is proved by the extracts given in the present article from Ségur, De Pradt, and Favier, which might be multiplied, if necessary, to any extent. In our speculations on this subject, we have little or no credit to claim on the score of originality, nor have we ever presented them as anything different from what we deem them, that is, probable speculations and not certainties. The vague charge of exaggeration can of course only be repelled by an equally vague contradiction. If any real errors can be pointed out in our statements or reasonings, we shall be ever happy to acknowledge and correct them. It is easy to see the interested motives, which may lead a certain class of politicians to represent our views as tinctured with extravagance; but we submit it to their consideration, and that of the public, whether existing facts are altered by pretending to doubt their reality, or dangers averted by denying their existence. In this, as in most other cases, it would in our opinion be a safer course for the interested parties to look the danger full in the face, ascertain its precise character, and act accordingly. The disastrous consequences of pursuing a different policy may already be seen, if we are not mistaken, in the actual situation of some of the great powers of Europe.

ART. VIII.—*Life of Arthur Lee, with his Political and Literary Correspondence, and his Papers on Diplomatic and Political Subjects.* By RICHARD HENRY LEE. Boston. Wells & Lilly. 1829. 2 vols. 8vo.

LITTLE has yet been published, which illustrates the early diplomatic history of the United States. The subject of foreign alliances engaged the attention of the Old Congress almost at the outset of its deliberations, and agents were secretly and openly sent abroad for the purpose of obtaining intelligence, in regard to the views of people and governments in Europe, some months before the declaration of independence. These were followed by Commissioners to treat with France, and by